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› Report on Good Practices in Energy and Climate Governance ‹



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▶ LIFE PlanUp

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It is the overarching goal of the LIFE + programme to act as a catalyst for changes in policy development and implementation by providing and disseminating solutions and best practices to achieve environmental and climate goals, and by promoting innovative environmental and climate change technologies.

The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Commission.



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› Introduction AND Background ‹





The challenges posed by climate change and the energy transition will shape national climate and energy policies for decades to come, both in the EU as well as across the globe. The likelihood of success in addressing these challenges will depend not only on what measures are taken by Governments, but also on how these are developed and implemented. Strong climate and energy governance arrangements can mobilize actors and resources, foster public support and ownership, and ensure that responsibilities and benefits are shared equitably.



▶▶ In the EU, the Energy Union and Climate Action Governance regulation is about to start its first ten-year cycle (2021-2030) of integrated national energy and climate plans (NECPs). Through this unprecedented governance mechanism, Member States have to present NECPs that collectively deliver on the EU's short- and long-term targets and are consistent with the Paris Agreement. Member States have already submitted their draft NECPs for 2021-2030 to the EU Commission. The EU Commission's recommendations to Member States in June 2019 have shown that these plans are currently not sufficient to meet the EU's commitments. The Member States now have to adjust their NECPs accordingly and submit the final version of their plans by the end of 2019. The NECPs are then to be updated after five years. At first glance, this governance arrangement appears to be only centered on EU Member States and the Commission. However, this is not the case, as the NECP process also stipulates the involvement of the public and stakeholders such as local and regional authorities (LRAs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). This is exactly the objective of the LIFE Plan-Up project, to spur this collaboration between these local actors and national policymakers in the NECPs. Member States are required to hold public consultations in the preparation of their NECPs and include the public's views in the plan submitted to the Commission, according to Art. 10 of the Governance regulation. Furthermore, under Art. 11 of the regulation,

Member States shall also establish a so-called multilevel climate and energy dialogue pursuant to national rules, in which LRAs, CSOs, businesses, investors, other stakeholders and the general public are able to engage and discuss the different scenarios for national energy and climate policies in the short- and long-term, and review progress made. The multilevel climate and energy dialogue is binding, but debating the NECPs specifically in this dialogue is not. Nevertheless, the Governance regulation makes it clear that this governance framework is suited to discuss the NECP. The NECPs can be considered as a key instrument, as they integrate energy and climate objectives into one strategy. Moreover, as these plans cover all five pillars of the EU Energy Union – decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy security, international energy market and research, innovation and competitiveness – they touch upon critical energy and climate issues that affect LRAs, CSOs, other stakeholders and the public. Through their NECPs, Member States need to take a wide range of key policy decisions for the next decade, such as their energy mix, mobility planning, building renovation, land use, waste management, climate adaptation and other fields. The societal, technological and investment choices made in these plans are also determining the future trajectory of the EU countries in decreasing their GHG emissions, reducing energy demand and increasing the share of renewable energy in the energy system.

It is evident that national policymakers in Member States face a challenging task in developing and implementing the NECPs. However, the public participation provisions foreseen in this process also mean that EU countries are not on their own in this undertaking. The opportunities offered by broadly involving the public and tapping into the experience, know-how and engagement of stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs in the NECPs are manifold: leveraging key contributions to the planning process, triggering investments, sharing responsibilities, increasing public support and ownership, raising ambition and a more adequate and swift implementation of the plan. By putting in place a strong energy and climate governance framework, in the form of a multilevel climate and energy dialogue, a more effective and inclusive design and delivery of the NECP can be ensured.

The multilevel climate and energy dialogue format, as stipulated in the Governance regulation, may seem like a novel idea. Yet, such an energy and climate governance framework, that involves CSOs, LRAs, other stakeholders and the public in effective participation processes, has already been established in different ways across the EU and also beyond the EU. The aim of this report is to present these good practices in energy and climate governance in the form of case studies. Furthermore, the objective is to derive from the experiences

of these case studies a set of joint recommendations for national policymakers in the LIFE PlanUp focus countries Romania, Spain, Italy, Poland and Hungary, as well as all other EU countries, on how to develop and implement a multilevel climate and energy dialogue in the framework of their NECPs. Moreover, the report also seeks to provide guidance on how to involve in particular LRAs and CSOs in this regard, thereby fostering public support and ownership, and also overcoming the gap between the local and national level in the NECP process. Additionally, this should also contribute to fostering an increased coordination and cooperation between LRAs, CSOs and national policymakers in the five LIFE PlanUp focus countries, as well as in all other EU countries.

The good practices in energy and climate governance featured in this report will firstly include seven examples from EU Member States: Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg. In addition to this, two case studies at international level will also be presented, one from Canada and another from the US State of California. The main reasoning for including examples beyond the EU is that the Canadian and Californian energy and climate governance experiences can also provide valuable takeaways for Member States' NECP process, in spite of the different existing political, legal and regulatory frameworks. ◀◀



› What constitutes a good practice in governance? ‹

The good practice examples in energy and climate governance presented here as case studies were selected and collected through a threefold approach:

1.

A qualitative assessment methodology developed by LIFE PlanUp

2.

Interviews with relevant actors (e.g. national policymakers, CSOs, LRAs, etc.) and

3.

Desk research

A template for good practices in energy and climate governance was created to undertake this approach in a standardized way. The template can be found in the report's annex.

In this chapter, the main features of the project's methodology will be outlined, and how it was used to identify and rank the good practices in energy and climate governance. A more detailed description of the methodology can be found on the LIFE PlanUp website. Then, the nine examples from France, Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and California will be presented in detail in the case studies.



The LIFE PlanUp qualitative assessment methodology draws from criteria and indicators from the following three main sources:

1. A study authored in May 2018 by Andreas Ruedinger for the French think tank IDDRI, which assesses the climate governance framework of the 2015 French Energy Transition Law
2. The good practice methodology of the Horizon 2020 PUBLENEF project
3. The LIFE Maximiser project tool to assess EU Member States' low-carbon development strategies

Based on these sources, the LIFE PlanUp project methodology created the following selection criteria, each underpinned by a set of indicators, to ascertain whether an energy and climate governance framework can be considered as a good practice:

Criteria	Indicators
Political commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Level of ownership within public authority › Level of support across political boundaries › Ability to survive political change
Institutional collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Multi-level governance › Cooperation within public authority
Governance structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Existence of governance structure › Status of governance structure › Legal bindingness
Stakeholder engagement & involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Method › Frequency › Depth › Input reflected in the process
Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Resources available › Clear definition of the actions › Clear division of responsibilities
Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Documentation available › Information on process available
Adaptability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Strategic revision › Capacity to adjust to changes & challenges
Replicability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Feasibility › Governance level
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Ambition › Level of policy detail › Monitoring & evaluation

Furthermore, a single scaling system was assigned to these nine selection criteria and corresponding 24 indicators, in order to ensure a consistent measurement and evaluation. However, different weights were assigned to the criteria by the LIFE PlanUp project consortium, in particular to those that focus on engaging with the public, coordination and cooperation between LRAs/CSOs and national policymakers and sharing of responsibilities, which are all key in a multilevel climate and energy dialogue format. Performing well in this regard thus allows for a higher score in the overall assessment of an energy and climate governance framework. The following weights were applied to the nine selection criteria:

Criteria	Points
Political commitment	10
Institutional collaboration	15
Governance structure	15
Stakeholder engagement & involvement	20
Action	7,5
Transparency	7,5
Adaptability	7,5
Replicability	7,5
Effectiveness	10
Total	100
Minimum score to be classified as a good practice in energy & climate governance	65

A high grade in the criteria stakeholder engagement and involvement, institutional collaboration and governance structure are key, as these criteria combined account for half of the points in this evaluation and measurement system. The LIFE PlanUp project partners then decided that an energy and climate governance framework should achieve at least a score of 65 points, in order to be classified as a good practice in energy and climate governance.

Based on the methodology, the nine examples from France, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Canada and California were then identified and ranked as good practices in energy and climate governance. The ranking can be found below, while the comparative overview table in chapter 3 will go into more detail on how the examples performed in the selection criteria:

› France: National Debate for 2015 Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth	93
› Netherlands: Stakeholder roundtables for national climate agreement	92
› Sweden: Parliamentary Committee with stakeholders for Long-Term Climate Policy Framework 2017	92
› Luxembourg: Climate Pact between State and municipalities	91
› Ireland: The National Dialogue on Climate Action	87
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› Case Studies ‹



3.1 FRANCE

National Debate for the 2015 Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth



› **Background**

France has established itself as one of the frontrunners in energy and climate policies at EU and international level. The country played a key role in brokering the Paris Agreement at the COP21. It has one of the lowest CO₂-intensities among European countries, which is mainly due to its nuclear-dominated power mix. However, its nuclear dependency comes at a significant environmental cost, as it struggles to properly dispose of its radioactive waste. By 2050, France aims to achieve net-zero GHG emissions. Alongside some other EU countries, France also seeks to surpass its 2030 GHG emission reduction target in the sectors covered by the ESR, as it plans to cut its GHG emissions there by 41%, instead of its legally binding share of 37%.

› **Main features of the good practice**

Several developments were critical in leading to the adoption of the Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth (Loi relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte – LTECV in short) in August 2015. Firstly, France's role as host for the COP21 triggered domestic political momentum to establish the LTECV, in order to also show leadership in the run-up to the UNFCCC negotiations. Secondly, the Law was not created from scratch, but could build on the principles of a series of previous regulations put in place since the 2000s, such as from the 2005 Energy Programme Act, which legally anchored overarching climate mitigation objectives for the first time in France, or later the Grenelle laws, which set sector-specific objectives. The development of these regulations were also characterized by a gradual increase in stakeholder and public involvement. Thirdly, the election of Socialist President François Hollande in 2012 proved to be key, as he followed up on his campaign pledge to implement a new governance process to elaborate a long-term strategic vision that would include a reduced role of nuclear. This process manifested itself in the organization of a large-scale National Debate on the Energy Transition from November 2012 to July 2013, which sought to determine a collective vision for the transition to a low-carbon economy. The recommendations resulting from the National Debate would then form the basis of the LTECV. The National Debate was led by the French Government, but involved all governance levels.

Total score

93 out of
100 points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The National Debate and the LTECV were key priorities of the Socialist Government, and therefore broadly supported by President Hollande and the Ministers of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy that held office between 2012 and 2015, notably by Delphine Batho (2012-2013) and Ségolène Royal (from 2014 onwards).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

The 2015 Law could pass the votes in Parliament without being watered down in its critical elements. It was adopted with a large majority by parties across the political spectrum, although some opposition from the center-right occurred, and the far-right and communist groups abstained from the vote. A group of senators from the Republican party also called on the French Constitutional Court to check the legality of the Law, claiming that the legislative procedure had not been duly followed, but this claim was ultimately rejected by the Constitutional Court.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully supported

Ability to survive political change

Even though France experienced a political change with the election of the center-right Emmanuel Macron as President in 2017, the LTECV has since then not been affected by this change in its form or substance. It is still broadly backed across political boundaries. The participative culture triggered by the National Debate has also been carried over in the development of recent energy and climate policies.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political
change



**Overall
score**

10 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

During the National Debate and the drafting of the LTECV, LRAs played a key role, as representatives of LRAs associations were directly involved in ensuring that the key recommendations of the debate would then be taken up in the law. Furthermore, the LTECV contributed to strengthening multi-level energy and climate governance in a traditionally centralized country, by providing LRAs with key responsibilities in supporting national energy and climate action. The LTECV stipulates that local authorities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and all regions have to develop integrated climate, air and energy strategies with clear quantified targets, for which they can solicit technical assistance from e.g. the French national energy and environment agency (ADEME).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
strong multi-level
governance with key role
for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

For the elaboration of the LTECV proposal, long and complex negotiations took place between all French Ministries, within the format of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Sustainable Development. The Directorate General for Energy and Climate was also involved, as well as a special stakeholder commission presided by Laurence Tubiana, France's chief negotiator in the Paris Agreement process at the COP21.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

15 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

A broad governance architecture was set up to manage the National Debate, which included a high-level Steering Committee, a general Secretariat for the operational organization appointed by the Ministry, several liaison committees (for local debates, dialogue with companies), a citizen committee made up of 20 randomly selected citizens, an expert group and also a National Debate Council on the Energy Transition, involving 112 members coming from the State, the Parliament, LRAs, companies and CSOs. As a result of the debate, a permanent stakeholder representative body, the National Council for the Ecological Transition (NCET), gathering 50 members from six stakeholder groups, was created to institutionalize permanent stakeholder consultation on energy and climate issues. Furthermore, the LTECV established an advisory body, the Expert Committee on the Energy Transition, which is tasked with providing independent review and assessments.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to
deliver governance
framework






Figure 1: Governance architecture of the French National Debate (Source: IDDRI)

Status of governance structure

The NCET was involved in the entire duration of the LTECV drafting process, as several of its members were part of the special stakeholder commission which ascertained that the Government included all key recommendations resulting from the National Debate in the law proposal submitted to the Parliament. The Expert Committee was created as a permanent body to oversee the delivery of the LTECV.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created
for delivery of framework

Legal bindingness

The NCET as a consultative body and the Expert Committee as an advisory body have to be associated at all levels of the policy process (adoption of laws, elaboration and review of strategies) on a permanent basis. In relation to the LTECV, this means for example reviewing draft versions of the two main planning instruments that the law introduced, which are the National Low-Carbon Strategy and the Multiannual Energy Plan. Although the NCET and the Expert Committee hold this key role, their mandate does not involve taking legally binding decisions.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body not
legally binding



**Overall
score**

11 out of 15 points



➤ Stakeholder engagement and involvement

Method

The 8-month long French National Debate on the Energy Transition stands out for the variety of formats that it used to engage and involve stakeholders and citizens. Nine plenary sessions were held by the National Council of the Debate, multiple public hearings organized with foreign experts and over 1,000 local and regional debates with 170,000 participants were held across the country. Moreover, eight working groups, involving the stakeholder groups of the National Debate Council and experts, were set up to discuss a broad spectrum of energy and climate issues, such as e.g. the future role of nuclear in the energy mix, the role of energy efficiency and conservation in the low-carbon transition and the economic consequences of long-term emission reductions. The stakeholder working groups and experts also co-developed four sets of long-term decarbonization scenarios, to assess which trajectory would be best suited to meet France’s energy and climate objectives.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation




Figure 2: Overview of scenarios proposed during the National Debate (Source: IDDRI and Ecologic)

Frequency

Throughout the National Debate on the Energy Transition process, stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs had regular opportunities to provide their views and inputs.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
often engagement with stakeholders

Depth

All relevant stakeholder groups could participate in the French National Debate on the Energy Transition throughout its several consultation formats.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups participating

Input reflected in the process

The comments from stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs were taken seriously in the National Debate process, both in shaping how the debate would be held (e.g. formats, scope) and also in regard to which policy recommendations would be drawn from it for the common synthesis report published at the end of the debate in July 2013. Only few stakeholders such as the trade union Force Ouvrière and the CSO Greenpeace didn't accept the debate conclusions nor participated in the debate, mainly due to their opposition to nuclear, whose phase-out was not on the debate's agenda. As mentioned earlier, the key recommendations of the National Debate were integrated in the LCTEV adopted in 2015, thereby ensuring that the time and effort dedicated by the stakeholders and the public participating was not in vain.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully reflected

**Overall score**

20 out of 20 points

**Action****Resources available**

As concerns the management and coordination of the National Debate on the Energy Transition, significant human and financial resources were made available by the French Government, which is evidenced e.g. by the establishment of the debate's General Secretariat, for which specialized staff was recruited by the Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy. In addition to this, the various committees and groups were equipped with the necessary resources to hold their meetings in the framework of the debate. However, the Expert Committee that is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the LCTEV, has not been provided with such human or financial resources, as its experts have to volunteer in their own time. This lack of resources has undermined the capacity of the Expert Committee.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
resources available to some extent



Clear definition of the actions

For the National Debate, the tasks and objectives of the General Secretariat and the various committees and groups involved in it were clearly laid out, which ensured an effective implementation of the process. The LCTEV clearly defines the actions that have to be undertaken by key actors, as e.g. the State, LRAs and also investment funds, which are obliged to assess climate-related risks in their financial reporting.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

The governance architecture of the National Debate ensured that responsibilities were clearly divided between the different actors and bodies. The 2015 LCTEV stipulates in principle the responsibilities of the State, LRAs and other actors for its implementation, lacks however an explicit mechanism for coordination or effort sharing when it comes to the interactions between the strategies developed at national, regional and local level. This concerned e.g. the deployment of renewables, where the regional targets equaled double the national objective, while the aggregation of energy efficiency targets fell short of meeting national ambitions.

Scale
1 out of 2 =
responsibilities divided to some extent


Overall score

5,5 out of 7,5 points

 **Transparency**

Documentation available

The National Debate, through its participative public website, as well as the drafting process of the LCTEV (through the websites of the Parliament and the Government) were thoroughly documented throughout their duration.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

Citizens not only received early and effective information about the National Debate, but could also participate in it through the citizen committee (its 20 citizens were randomly chosen), the local and regional debates, a dedicated “citizen energy day” and by providing written contributions on the debate’s public website.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
information fully made available


Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Adaptability

Strategic revision

The LCTEV integrates clear procedures for strategic revision. The governance framework introduced by the LCTEV is established as an iterative process that enables to adjust strategic milestones over time to ensure their alignment with long-term objectives. It also foresees the option to review long-term targets, which has been already done since the LCTEV is in place, by moving recently from the initial target of minus 75% GHG emissions by 2050 to a net-zero GHG emissions target.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The French Law also enables the country to adjust its energy and climate policies to changes and challenges, mainly through its innovative principle of binding carbon budgets (lasting between three to five years) that are laid out in the National Low-Carbon Strategy. The LCTEV's economy-wide carbon budgets set an overall emission limit that cannot be exceeded in each budget period. The budgets can be adapted to reflect potential over- or underachievement, and their allocation among different sectors can also be modified, depending on their performance or on external factors.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges




Figure 3: Indicative distribution of carbon budgets in first periods under the LCTEV (Source: IDDRI)



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Replicability

Feasibility

Replicating the National Debate on the Energy Transition and the governance framework that was created by the 2015 French Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth is possible, and would require in particular the creation of new dedicated governance bodies directly involving stakeholders to govern the transition (in the French case, e.g. the National Council for the Ecological Transition) and the political willingness to take up stakeholder and public contributions in a legal act.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, the French National Debate and the 2015 Law can be replicated at several governance levels (e.g. national, regional).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Effectiveness

Ambition

The French LCTEV stands out in this regard, as it presents legally binding ambitious and coherent targets, with clear intermediary milestones for 2020 and 2030, and also supporting objectives (e.g. on reducing energy demand, diversification of energy supply) that can be adapted over time. The binding targets concern not only the reduction of GHG emissions (at least minus 40% by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050 compared to 1990), the reduction of final energy consumption (has to be cut in half by 2050 compared to 2012 levels) or the share of renewables in the energy mix (32% by 2030), but also for example sectoral targets for the waste (50% less waste in landfill by 2025) buildings (by 2050, all buildings have to be retrofitted to a low energy standard) or transport sectors (number of electric vehicle charging stations that has to be reached by 2030).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully ambitious and coherent targets



Level of policy detail

In order to ensure the achievement of these targets, the 2015 Law provides for detailed and feasible policy orientations and mechanisms, both at an economy-wide level as well as for all sectors. The LCTEV includes as a key policy tool e.g. a carbon tax, which sets out a carbon-pricing trajectory from 2015-2030 that has to be imposed on the carbon component of fossil fuels and thereby provides a long-term perspective for investments and behaviors. Another key policy tool stipulated by the Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth involves the previously mentioned two planning instruments, the National Low-Carbon Strategy and the Multiannual Energy Plan, which have to lay out in detail energy and climate measures that are aligned with the short-, mid- and long-term targets enshrined in the LCTEV.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully detailed and feasible policies

Monitoring and evaluation

Regular and thorough reporting processes have been established to evaluate policy progress in meeting the objectives of the LCTEV. The National Low-Carbon Strategy and the Multiannual Energy Plan are submitted to regular reviews in an annual or biannual timeframe, undergoing comprehensive revisions every five years. The binding carbon budgets are also reviewed every five years, as well as the regional strategies that have to collectively add up to the national targets. Some of these processes are overlapping and running in parallel, adding to the complexity of the overall monitoring and evaluation process set up by the French Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth. Furthermore, not only the National Council for the Ecological Transition and the Expert Committee are involved in the review process for the two planning instruments, but also entities like e.g. the Advisory Energy Council or the Environmental Authority, making the reporting process more time-consuming. The main advisory body for the LCTEV, the Expert Committee, cannot enforce compliance in case the Government misses the law's targets. In addition to this, a shortcoming of the monitoring and evaluation approach is that the LCTEV does not specify if and how the Government has to take into account the advice provided by the Expert Committee in its reviews, which weakens the position of the Expert Committee in holding the Government accountable to its policies taken.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular reporting to some extent




**Overall
score**

9 out of 10 points



3.2 NETHERLANDS

Stakeholder roundtables for national climate agreement



› **Background**

In recent years, the Netherlands has experienced drastic changes in its energy and climate policies. The landmark climate litigation case brought in 2015 by the campaign group Urgenda legally obliges the Dutch State to ramp up its GHG emission cuts by 2020. Under the Government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the country seeks to exit from coal, end its gas production by 2030 and phase out natural gas from all residential buildings by 2050. Furthermore, the following short- and long-term energy and climate objectives are in the process of being approved through a climate act: reducing GHG emissions by **49% by 2030** and by **95% by 2050**, compared to 1990, as well as achieving a carbon-neutral electricity system.

› **Main features of the good practice**

It is in this context, that the Netherlands is preparing a national climate agreement, in the form of a large-scale negotiation and debate process with all stakeholders. The climate agreement is a key pillar of the coalition agreement of Rutte's Government, but it is not the first of its kind in the country. Already in 2013, the energy agreement for sustainable growth was negotiated to reduce energy consumption and increase the share of renewables. The objective of the new climate agreement is to operationalize the 2030 GHG emission reduction target of the climate act, by defining how the five sectors industry, mobility, built environment, electricity and agriculture and land use will contribute to achieving it. Discussions on each of the sectors are held in the format of stakeholder roundtables. The climate agreement process began in March 2018, and is set to conclude by the end of 2019. It is led at national level by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate.



Total score

92 out of
100 points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The climate agreement is broadly supported and championed by key political actors such as Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Erik Wiebes, as well as by the political parties of the governing coalition.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

Alongside the four parties involved in the coalition (VVD, CDA, D66, ChristenUnie), four parties from the opposition (Groen-Links, PvdA, SP, 50Plus) are also backing the climate agreement. However, other opposition parties such as the far-right groups PVV and the FvD, as well as smaller political groups as e.g. the Party for the Animals, are rejecting the agreement.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
supported to some extent

Ability to survive political change

While not all political parties in the Netherlands are in favor of the agreement, as outlined before, the longevity of this energy and climate governance framework can still be assured. The main reason for this is that a significant part of the opposition is siding with the governing coalition to bring the climate agreement over the legislative finish line, and subsequently ensure its implementation.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political change



**Overall
score**

15 out of 15 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

Through the climate agreement, responsibilities are clearly shared between the national level and LRAs. Local governments are enabled to play their role, thanks to the right regulatory conditions and additional national financial support for covering their increased implementation costs, as e.g. for phasing out gas in the local built environment. Furthermore, the regional energy strategies of the 33 Dutch regions are based on mutual benefits and sharing burdens, as they contribute and add-up to achieving national targets, such as e.g. for renewable electricity on land. These strategies are also grounded in a multi-actor approach, which mobilizes all public and private stakeholders to jointly take responsibility for achieving the goals.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
strong multi-level
governance with
key role for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate is leading more than other Ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Interior, Infrastructure) on the climate agreement process. The Ministries negotiated between themselves to divide the work and budget available for the process. The lion's share of the implementation was taken on ultimately by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

15 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

A Climate Council was set up to manage and coordinate the large-scale negotiation and debate process with stakeholders to reach the national climate agreement. The Climate Council is chaired by the former Minister of the Environment, Ed Nijpels, who is also overseeing the execution of the 2013 energy agreement. It consists of representatives from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, LRAs, CSOs, business and other relevant stakeholders, as well as the chairs of the stakeholder roundtables on the five sectors (electricity, built environment, mobility, industry, agriculture & land use), which are led by independent and renowned experts.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to
deliver governance
framework






Figure 4: Governance structure of the Dutch climate agreement (Source: Klimaatakkoord website)

Status of governance structure

The Climate Council was set up for the entirety of the climate agreement process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created for delivery of framework

Legal bindingness

The Climate Council takes on a key role in the process to reach the climate agreement, due to its position as a coordinating consultative body. The agreement reached under its mandate is enforceable, yet still requires approval by the Dutch Parliament in order to become fully operational.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
governance body somewhat legally binding



Overall score

13 out of 15 points

Input reflected in the process

Following the Dutch consensus-based Polder Model, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate is taking all stakeholders seriously and reflecting their input in the negotiations. The Government also wants the approval and buy-in from all players, in order to consider the agreement as successful. The draft agreement in December 2018 was however rejected by green CSOs, green industry and the labor union FNV, as it did not include their idea of a carbon tax for industry. Currently, the Government is seeking to remedy this situation by coming up with a proposal for a “smart” carbon tax, that would be acceptable to all actors for the final agreement.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
stakeholder input reflected to some extent

**Overall score**

19 out of 20 points

**Action****Resources available**

In the beginning of the climate agreement process, there were differences in the resources made available to the stakeholder roundtables on the five sectors. The agriculture table e.g. didn't have budget at first for taking minutes and renting meeting rooms. While the situation was then corrected, it did lead to a slow start.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
resources available to some extent

Clear definition of the actions

It took several months to agree on the objectives and terms of reference of the five sectorial tables and their chairs. However, once this was done, the course of action was clear for the remainder of the negotiation process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Responsibilities were also clearly assigned. The coordination and management was done by the Climate Council. The chairs of the five tables drew up the composition of their respective tables, and each table had the mandate to make agreements for their sector, with stakeholders making proposals for policies and measures.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and clearly divided

**Overall score**

6,5 out of 7,5 points



› Transparency

Documentation available

The climate agreement process was continuously documented and made available to the public, notably through its website, but also through direct interaction with citizens through so-called citizen talks. The aim of these talks was to gather citizens' reflections on the agreement, and their concerns and wishes about the climate.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

The public also received early and effective information on the climate agreement. In May and June 2018 e.g., five regional meetings were held, where citizens could directly discuss with negotiators what the agreement would mean for their region.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made available



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



› Adaptability

Strategic revision

The first (July 2018) and second (December 2018) version of the agreement have undergone strategic revision through assessments done by the Government advisory agencies PBL (Environmental Assessment Agency) and CPB (Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), which calculated not only whether the negotiated proposals add up to achieving the 2030 target of minus 49% GHG emissions, but also if the agreement is financially sound, both in terms of its budgetary and income effects.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The negotiations were characterized by a high level of flexibility. While the basic configuration of the five sector tables remained, other formats (e.g. sub-tables, clusters) were set up and then discontinued, once they had fulfilled their purpose.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Replicability

Feasibility

Replicating the climate agreement process is possible, as it requires in particular political will, a level playing field with stakeholders and a clear target to negotiate on, which in the case of the Netherlands is the sectoral contributions to its 2030 target.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to
a high extent

Governance level

The aforementioned considerations also mean that a framework such as the climate agreement can be replicated at several governance levels (local, regional, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple
levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Effectiveness

Ambition

The independent assessments done by the Government agencies PBL and CPB highlight that the 500 negotiated proposals for policies and measures of the agreement are in principle coherent and ambitious enough to achieve the 2030 target, but also stress that the industry's contribution in particular is still not sufficient, and also that the financial burden for low-income households is too high.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ambitious and coherent
targets to some extent

Level of policy detail

The PBL and CPB assessments also note that some of the climate agreement's proposals still would need to be fleshed out in more detail, into specific instruments and actions. The parties to the agreement should also define in greater detail their contributions and commitments to ensure the achievement of the 2030 target.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible
policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The Climate Council is responsible for the reporting process. It monitors progress, ensures coherence between the sectors and the regional strategies, and ascertains that cross-cutting issues are addressed. Once the final agreement is reached, it will also make proposals for monitoring and evaluating its implementation.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular
reporting process



Overall score

7 out of 10 points



3.3 SWEDEN

Parliamentary Committee with stakeholders for Long-Term Climate Policy Framework 2017



› **Background**

Sweden has been for several decades a pioneer in energy and climate policies at European and international level. It introduced a national carbon tax already in 1991, and has also put in place a CO₂ tax on aviation. In 2018, Sweden had the lowest ratio of GHG emissions per GDP among all EU Member States. Furthermore, the country managed to meet its 2030 renewable energy target by the end of 2018. Sweden is also one of the few EU countries that has set itself a higher 2030 GHG emission reduction target in the sectors covered by the ESR: it is legally obliged to reduce its GHG emissions there by 40%, but seeks to cut them by 63% instead.

› **Main features of the good practice**

Since 1999, Sweden has an environmental objectives system, which defines 16 long-term environmental goals that the country has to achieve. Under this system, each goal is evaluated and revisited by a Parliamentarian Cross-Party Committee on Environmental Objectives involving all stakeholder groups, which can lead to developing new frameworks in policy areas. The Committee advises the Government on how the environmental goals can be achieved, and the Government can also direct the Committee on what it should look into. In 2014, the newly elected minority coalition of Social Democrats and Greens instructed the Committee to examine how a climate policy framework for a long-term climate policy could be designed. From 2014 till 2016, the Committee and its participating stakeholders developed its proposal for Sweden's framework, which was then adopted by the Swedish Parliament in June 2017. The Swedish long-term climate policy framework includes the target of net-zero GHG emissions by 2045, a Climate Act, which entered into force in 2018, and the creation of a Climate Policy Council.

Total score

91 out of **100** points



Performance across criteria in detail



➤ Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The long-term climate policy framework was a key objective of the minority coalition and thus broadly supported within the Government, including by key figures such as Prime Minister Stefan Löfven (Social Democrats) and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Environment and Climate Isabella Lövin (Greens). The Swedish Greens had also been the first party in 2012 to call for the introduction of such a framework.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

The Parliament approved the long-term climate policy framework with a large majority. All parties backed the proposal, except for the far-right Sweden Democrats. A key factor in gathering broad backing across the political spectrum was the fact that the seven political parties which supported the framework were directly involved in its drafting through their membership in the Cross-Party Committee. Only the Sweden Democrats opted to not join this Committee.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully supported

Ability to survive political change

Two years after its adoption, the Swedish climate policy framework is still in place and continues to be broadly supported by Sweden's political parties, with the ongoing exception of the Sweden Democrats. Although the Sweden Democrats performed well in recent national and EU elections, their ongoing political isolation makes a substantial change to the framework in the near future unlikely.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political
change



Overall score

10 out of 10 points



➤ Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

As such, the long-term climate policy framework does not specify how responsibilities between the national level and LRAs are shared for its implementation. However, LRAs could play a key role in the overall drafting process, as the representatives of LRAs associations were part of the Cross-Party Committee. Furthermore, the framework was developed under the environmental objectives system, in which LRAs have responsibilities assigned to ensure their achievement.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
multi-level governance
with small role for LRAs



Cooperation within public authority

The creation of the framework mainly resided within the Committee, which also worked with experts from several Government agencies (e.g. Environmental Protection Agency) and Ministries in drafting its proposal for the Government. The responsible Ministry, the Ministry for Environment and Climate, issued the proposal into a bill that the Parliament then voted on, following a public consultation process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
some division of responsibilities within public authority



Overall score

11 out of 15 points



Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

An existing governance body, the Cross-Party Committee, was used to establish the framework. The Committee consisted of 45 members, composed of lawmakers from seven political parties, representatives from LRAs, industries, business, trade unions and CSOs. It was chaired by Anders Wijkman, a former MEP from the centre-right Christian Democrats. The Committee was supported in its work by a 5-person Secretariat. The framework established the Climate Policy Council, consisting of independent scientific experts, which is tasked with overseeing its effective delivery.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to deliver governance framework

Status of governance structure

The Cross-Party Committee on Environmental Objectives and the Secretariat supporting it were involved in the entire duration of the drafting process. The Climate Policy Council was set up as a permanent Government authority in the framework's implementation. Its mandate is modeled after Sweden's Fiscal Policy Council, which takes on a similar role in the country's fiscal policy framework.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created for delivery of framework

Legal bindingness

While the Committee brought forward the proposal for the framework, it only entered into force after being adopted by the Parliament. The Climate Policy Council cannot take legally binding decisions (e.g. legal reviews) as concerns the framework's delivery. Yet, the Council has a broad mandate that goes beyond oversight, as it can also make recommendations, propose measures and issue wide-ranging reviews of Government policies in relation to the framework.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body not legally binding



Overall score

11 out of 15 points





Stakeholder engagement and involvement

Method

The main format through which stakeholders were engaged and involved in the creation of the climate policy framework was the meetings of the Committee, which usually started with knowledge-building sessions to gather a common understanding of the challenge at hand. The Committee also organized hearings where stakeholders and the public that were not part of the Committee could attend and voice their views. Furthermore, the proposal for the framework was sent for referral (i.e. public consultation) before it was submitted to the Parliament, which constituted an opportunity for all stakeholders and citizens to provide their inputs.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

The Cross-Party Committee's meetings were held on a monthly basis, and the hearings it held were organized on a regular basis throughout 2015 and 2016.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
often engagement with
stakeholders

Depth

All relevant stakeholder groups were directly involved in the Committee. In addition to this, over 200 stakeholders submitted their contributions in the referral process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups
participating

Input reflected in the process

Stakeholders participating in the Committee appreciated the fair, open and constructive discussions they could hold with the Parliamentary members. An equal level playing field was also ensured through a balance of representation in the Committee between LRAs, CSOs, industry and other stakeholders. The views from stakeholders were seriously taken into consideration, which was also ascertained by the Committee's chair who listened to all parties equally. And even though it was ultimately the Parliamentarians who wrote the proposal for the framework, stakeholders noted that their inputs were largely integrated in the final document.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully
reflected



Overall score

20 out of 20 points



➤ Action

Resources available

Significant human and financial resources were made available for the drafting process of the Swedish climate policy framework. This manifested itself not only in the 5-person Secretariat that was set up to support the Committee's work, but also in the study visits that were organized for the Committee to attend the COP21 in Paris in 2015 and to travel to the UK to learn from other good practices in energy and climate governance in the field (UK's Climate Change Act).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
resources fully available

Clear definition of the actions

The tasks and objectives of the Committee and its Secretariat were clearly set out from the onset, which enabled an effective implementation of the process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Responsibilities were also clearly assigned, with the Committee in charge of drafting the proposal for the framework and the Secretariat coordinating the contributions from stakeholders. Furthermore, the Secretariat, alongside with Government bodies such as the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, conducted ex-ante impact assessments of the framework, focusing in particular on its long-term targets.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and
clearly divided



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Transparency

Documentation available

Throughout the drafting process of the climate policy framework, all relevant documentation was made available by the Swedish Government on its website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made
available

Information on process available

Through the organization of regular hearings, the public received early and effective information about the long-term climate policy framework. Citizens could also discuss with Committee members during these conferences on various aspects of the framework and submit their comments on it in the referral process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made
available



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Adaptability

Strategic revision

The Climate Act under the Swedish framework stipulates a clear procedure for strategic revision, by legislating that the Government must submit a climate report to the Parliament as part of the annual budget bill. In the climate report, an assessment has to be included which identifies whether additional measures and policies are needed to achieve the necessary emission reductions, and if so, when and how these can be adopted. This could entail also the adoption of additional reduction targets to meet the objective of net-zero GHG emissions by 2045.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic
revision fully included




Figure 6: Sweden's GHG emission reduction trajectory stipulated by the climate policy framework (Source: Swedish Climate Policy Council)

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The Climate Act also requires the Government to undertake a flexible climate policy that is aligned with climate science and reflects relevant technical, social, economic and environmental considerations. Moreover, the Climate Act states that Sweden's climate policies have to be aligned with the budgetary cycles and objectives, which constitutes a major innovation, as it could lead to the adoption of state budgets that are in line with national commitments, meaning that these are effectively climate-mainstreamed.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to
changes and challenges



**Overall
score**

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Replicability

Feasibility

The Swedish climate policy framework is replicable, and requires in particular to provide the Parliament (through its Committees) with a key role in designing national energy and climate policies, enabling stakeholders to directly co-shape this process on an equal footing and the political will to enshrine a close link between climate considerations and the national annual budgeting process into law.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

With this in mind, the Swedish long-term climate policy framework can be replicated at several governance levels (e.g. national, regional, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Effectiveness

Ambition

The Swedish climate policy framework sets out ambitious and coherent targets for 2030 (minus 63% GHG emissions in sectors covered by ESR), 2040 (minus 75% GHG emissions in sectors covered by ESR) and 2045 (net-zero GHG emissions) that follow a sound decarbonization trajectory. After 2045, Sweden should achieve negative emissions. Emission reductions can be achieved to a varying extent through supplementary measures, such as by enhancing forests as carbon sinks or by funding climate projects abroad. Furthermore, the framework includes an objective for the transport sector, which is among the most challenging sectors to decarbonize in Sweden: GHG emissions from domestic transport (excluding domestic aviation) have to be cut by at least 70% by 2030 compared to 2010. While the targets are not included specifically in the Climate Act, the Act imposes a legal obligation on the Government to pursue a climate policy based on these goals.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully ambitious and coherent targets

Level of policy detail

The adoption of the framework did not bring with it already the establishment of detailed and feasible policies to ensure the achievement of the targets. However, the Climate Act requires the Government to draw up every four years a climate policy action plan, in which it has to describe how it tends to achieve the country's objectives. The climate policy action plan has to notably integrate detailed information about planned emission reduction measures, how these contribute to the targets, their projected emission reduction potential and their outcomes. The first climate policy action plan under the framework is scheduled to be published in 2019.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
fully detailed and feasible policies




Figure 7: Sweden's GHG emission reduction targets under the long-term climate policy framework (Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency)

Monitoring and evaluation

The Swedish framework stands out for its robust, clear and comprehensive reporting process. The annual climate review that the Government has to submit to the Parliament includes a report on the key political climate decisions taken during the year, increases transparency and raises political attention and visibility on the process, which is further ensured through its coupling with the budget process. Moreover, the Climate Policy Council as an independent expert advisory body holds a key role in monitoring and evaluating the Government's performance in achieving the framework's objectives. The Council's assessments track progress through in-depth assessments that ascertain whether the country is moving in the right direction towards meeting its goals. In its 2019 report, the Council already called out on the Government to accelerate climate action, as it considers decarbonization progress in particular in the transport sector as too slow. Although the Council cannot enforce compliance if the Government misses the targets, its analyses can contribute to increase public accountability and raise pressure from the Parliament.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular reporting process




Overall score

10 out of 10 points



3.4 LUXEMBOURG

Climate Pact between State and municipalities



› **Background**

Recently, Luxembourg has aimed to position itself as an EU energy and climate frontrunner, by being one of the few countries that set a higher GHG emission reduction target in the sectors covered by the EU Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR): instead of aiming for 40% cuts by 2030, it seeks to achieve cuts of more than 50% compared to 2005 levels. The country is also part of a growing coalition of EU countries that support an EU net-zero GHG emissions target for 2050. As concerns the EU's 2020 objectives, Luxembourg has committed to decrease its GHG emissions by 20% compared to 2005 under the sectors covered by the EU ESR mechanism.



› **Main features of the good practice**

In order to reach its 2020 GHG emission reduction target, the Government recognized that it needed local authorities as a strategic partner to support national efforts. This resulted in September 2012 in the adoption of a law establishing a Climate Pact between the State and its municipalities. Under the Climate Pact, the municipalities voluntarily commit to take action to reduce their GHG emissions and track their progress transparently through the European Energy Award (EEA) quality management and certification system. In return, the Government provides financial and technical assistance to support the municipalities in this process. The Climate Pact law stipulates that the Government can provide financial support to the municipalities participating in the Pact from 2013 till the end of 2020. Prior to the Climate Pact, the Government had provided financial support to municipalities through the national Environment Protection Fund. The Climate Pact is led at national level by the national energy agency myenergy, which manages it under the mandate of the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development.



Total score

91 out of
100 points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The Luxembourgish Climate Pact is broadly supported and championed by key political figures such as the Minister of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development, Carole Dieschbourg, the Minister of Energy and Spatial Planning, Claude Turmes, and the political parties of the governing coalition.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

The law on the Climate Pact was also adopted with a large majority in the Luxembourgish Parliament by parties across the political spectrum.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully supported

Ability to survive political change

The strong political support for the Climate Pact has ensured its duration beyond political cycles. Furthermore, the Government has already put in place a renewal of the Climate Pact for the period 2021-2030, in order to strengthen this framework to support the achievement of the national energy and climate objectives.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political
change



**Overall
score**

10 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

The Climate Pact clearly shares responsibilities between the national and the local level in Luxembourg. The Climate Pact contract signed between the State and a municipality defines the obligations between both parties. The municipality commits to put in place the EEA quality control system on its territory, define quantifiable measures to reduce GHG emissions and set up an energy management system. In return, the State commits to provide comprehensive technical assistance through myenergy and financial subsidies on an annual basis, enabling the municipality to take effective action, resulting in a win-win situation for both sides.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
strong multi-level
governance with key role
for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

The Climate Pact is mainly led by the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development, which has entrusted myenergy with the management of the governance framework. The Ministry and myenergy are in constant exchange to ensure its effective implementation. Other Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Energy and Spatial Planning (on energy issues) and the Ministry of Economy (on circular economy), are also involved in the Climate Pact process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

15 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

An existing entity, the national energy agency myenergy, was mandated to implement the Climate Pact between the State and its municipalities.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
working group or other
entity delivering framework

Status of governance structure

myenergy is responsible for delivering the Climate Pact for its entire duration.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body delivering
governance framework



Legal bindingness

As an administrative entity, myenergy is not taking legally binding decisions in the operation of the Climate Pact. Decisions to change its scope, e.g. the addition of the themes it covers, are done by the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development and then implemented by myenergy. A complete overhaul of the Climate Pact would require changes to the 2012 law that had established it, and such a process would have to go through the Luxembourgish Parliament.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body not
legally binding

**Overall score**

9 out of 15 points

**Stakeholder engagement and involvement****Method**

In the elaboration of the Climate Pact, the Government took a consensus and dialogue approach to consult with LRAs and other stakeholders such as CSOs, trade unions or business associations. For this purpose, an Environment and Climate Partnership was set up, under which five thematic working groups (urban planning, mobility, energy, biodiversity and international aspects of climate change) involving stakeholders and Ministry officials drew up the proposal for the Climate Pact. A consultation debate was also held with the Parliament during the drafting process, to ensure broad support and buy-in from all relevant actors. As the Climate Pact is being implemented, the State continues to consult stakeholders, in particular its municipalities, to further fine-tune the Climate Pact to increase its effectiveness.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

Both in the creation and implementation of the Climate Pact, stakeholders such as municipalities (e.g. through the association Climate Alliance Luxembourg) are continuously engaged with by the Luxembourgish Government.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
often engagement with
stakeholders

Depth

All stakeholder groups are able to participate in shaping the Climate Pact process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups
participating



Input reflected in the process

In designing and delivering the Climate Pact, especially the views from the municipalities were taken up. All 105 Luxembourgish municipalities have now committed to the Pact, highlighting that it is tailored to local needs and demands.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
 stakeholder input fully reflected

Overall score

20 out of 20 points



➤ **Action**

Resources available

myenergy has been equipped with the required staff (currently 6 persons) and funding to manage the Climate Pact. The municipalities covered by the Pact can opt for an external climate advisor to support them in the EEA and the overall coordination process. The climate advisor is paid for by the State and provided by myenergy from a pool of certified energy and climate experts. Tools, methodologies and handbooks, developed by myenergy or commissioned through its partners, also support the municipalities to design and implement measures in the six areas of the Climate Pact: spatial planning, mobility, municipal buildings and facilities, internal organization, communication and cooperation, and supply and disposal.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
 resources fully available

Clear definition of the actions

The Climate Pact framework clearly defines the actions that all the main actors – the State, the municipalities and myenergy – have to undertake. The EEA process, which the Climate Pact uses, provides a clear structure for municipalities to take action.

Scale
2 out of 2 =
 actions clearly defined




Figure 8: Luxembourgish Climate Pact process (Source: myenergy)

Clear division of responsibilities

The allocation of responsibilities within the Climate Pact is also clear, with the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development ensuring political leadership, myenergy assuring the administrative operation of the overall framework and the municipalities assuming responsibilities in particular in those fields where they can create the most impact (e.g. buildings, mobility, spatial planning etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and
clearly divided

**Overall
score**

7,5 out of **7,5** points

**Transparency****Documentation available**

All documentation on the Climate Pact, such as e.g. how the participating municipalities are progressing, case studies, etc., are available on its public website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made
available

Information on process available

Citizens are not only informed about the Climate Pact through their municipality, but can also be involved in the process. As part of committing to the Climate Pact, each municipality has to set up a climate team, consisting of political representatives, the climate advisor, municipal staff, local businesses, experts and also citizens.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made
available

**Overall
score**

7,5 out of **7,5** points

**Adaptability****Strategic revision**

The Luxembourgish Climate Pact is not a static governance framework, but has undergone key strategic revisions in order to react to societal trends, with the introduction of new priorities like air quality and circular economy in recent years.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic
revisions fully included



Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The Climate Pact’s capacity to react to changes and challenges is reflected in its effectiveness to develop new tools and instruments, which ensures that the municipalities can swiftly move forward in working on newly integrated priorities.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Replicability

Feasibility

The replication of the Climate Pact is possible, and requires mainly a partnership on equal footing between the national and local level that clearly defines contract modalities, and tailoring an existing local action instrument to national specificities, which is in Luxembourg the EEA quality management and certification system.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Taking all this into account, a framework like in Luxembourg could be also put in place between other governance levels, as e.g. between local and regional level.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Effectiveness

Ambition

The Climate Pact has effectively fostered the climate ambition of its municipalities through a coherent approach, by e.g. providing broad technical support, paying for a climate advisor and using the EEA system as a clear action framework to follow. The financial subsidies have also been critical in this regard, as particularly ambitious and effective municipalities can receive different levels of certification after passing an audit, which result in more funds from the State to realize their projects. As municipalities can also compare their efforts in the Climate Pact, it has fostered competition between neighboring municipalities in their climate action. However, the Climate Pact process has not yet triggered the same level of participation from citizens, thereby affecting local ambition. This is sought to be remedied with new initiatives on energy cooperatives and prosumers in the future of the Climate Pact.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully ambitious and coherent targets






Figure 9: Key figures on the Climate Pact (Source: Luxembourg Government website)

Level of policy detail

Although the Climate Pact process includes detailed information about feasible policies and measures that can be undertaken by the municipalities in the six areas, it misses out on also fostering the implementation of interdisciplinary projects, which would enable steeper GHG emission cuts that would then benefit the national efforts.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible
policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

myenergy has to provide an annual progress report on the Pact's implementation, as well as an activity report for the following year, which are both submitted to the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development. As concerns the data collection and quantification of results in the municipalities, this has been identified by the Ministry as an area to be improved for the future Climate Pact.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular
reporting to some extent



**Overall
score**

7 out of 10 points



3.5 IRELAND

The National Dialogue on Climate Action



› **Background**

In 2018, Ireland made international headlines by becoming the first country in the world to commit to divestment from fossil fuels, which means that the country’s sovereign fund has to divest its holdings of fossil fuel firms within five years. Ireland’s energy and climate objectives are grounded in its 2014 National Policy Position on Climate Action and Low Carbon Development and its 2015 Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act. In these key documents, a “national transition objective” is set out for Ireland, which is its transition to a low carbon, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable economy by 2050. This entails reaching carbon neutrality in its agriculture, land-use and forestry sectors, as well as a minimum 80% CO₂ reduction (compared to 1990) in its electricity, buildings and transport sectors. The national transition objective must be achieved through a series of successive national climate mitigation plans and adaptation frameworks.

› **Main features of the good practice**

The National Dialogue on Climate Action was established by the Government in 2017, with the main goal to build long-term societal consensus, community engagement and public support to enable the achievement of Ireland’s national transition objective. It also seeks to create awareness and motivation to act at all governance levels in relation to the climate change challenges. Moreover, another aim of the National Dialogue is to consult stakeholders on Ireland’s NECP, and to reach out to citizens and stakeholders that are usually not engaged in energy and climate issues. The National Dialogue on Climate Action is led at national level by the Irish Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment (DCCAE), with support from the Irish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It is the first initiative of this kind in Ireland to reach out on climate and energy to communities.

Total score

87 out of **100** points



Performance across criteria in detail



➤ Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The National Dialogue is broadly backed by key political actors such as the Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment Richard Bruton, Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and the political parties of the governing minority coalition (Fine Gael and Independent). It is also a vital part of the coalition agreement, the 2016 Programme for Partnership Government.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

Apart from the parties involved in the current Government, the National Dialogue on Climate Action is also supported by parties across the political spectrum in Ireland.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully supported

Ability to survive political change

Albeit the National Dialogue was put in place under a minority Government, the fact that it is also backed by the remaining political parties should ensure its duration beyond political cycles in Ireland.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political change



Overall score

10 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

While the National Dialogue on Climate Action is led by the DCCAE with support from the EPA, LRAs are also involved in the process to a certain extent, as the Government relies on their support in the organization of the regional gatherings. The regional gatherings form the backbone of the National Dialogue. LRAs and actors such as universities or local networks (e.g. Transition Towns) enable the national level to reach out to citizens, local communities and other key stakeholders to participate in the regional gatherings.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
multi-level governance
with small role for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

The DCCAE is the only Ministry leading the National Dialogue, in close collaboration with the EPA. Within the DCCAE, the Ministry Officials in charge of the Irish NECP are also participating in the National Dialogue process, as the views gathered through the Dialogue are also set to feed into the country's final NECP.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
some division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

11 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

The DCCAE has funded a 3-person Secretariat within the EPA to manage the ongoing National Dialogue. Moreover, the EPA has contracted the consultancy M.CO to support the Secretariat's work, in particular for providing facilitation during the regional gatherings. Furthermore, a 15-person advisory group was also established to provide advice on the strategy, structure and operation of the Dialogue. It is chaired by Elaine Nevin, former director of the renowned Irish environmental organization ECO-UNESCO. It consists notably of representatives from LRAs, CSOs, former national policymakers and independent experts.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to
deliver governance
framework

Status of governance structure

Both the Secretariat as well as its advisory group have been set up for the entirety of the National Dialogue process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created
for delivery of framework



Legal bindingness

The Secretariat and the advisory group have key coordinating and consultative functions in the National Dialogue. The mandate of these governance bodies does not involve taking legally binding decisions, but consists in delivering a rolling annual work programme that is subject to approval by the Minister of the DCCA.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body somewhat
legally binding

**Overall score**

11 out of 15 points



▶ Stakeholder engagement and involvement

Method

The main format to engage and involve stakeholders in the National Dialogue are its regional gatherings. The regional gatherings last one day and host roundtable discussions on different climate and energy topics, interactive information hubs (“drop-in areas”), workshop activities and presentations from keynote speakers. The roundtable discussions are facilitated by local climate ambassadors, EPA staff and the consultancy M.CO. In addition to the regional gatherings, several other Government and EPA initiatives fall under the umbrella of the National Dialogue, such as the EPA climate lecture series, the Tidy Towns Climate Action award, the Green Schools awareness programs or the EPA National Climate Conference.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation



Figure 10: Visual depiction of National Dialogue regional gathering in Tralee (Source: Ireland Climate Ambassador Programme Twitter Account)

Frequency

The regional gatherings are organized only every few months – two having been organized in June and November 2018, and three planned for 2019 – but the other formats of the National Dialogue mentioned beforehand provide other opportunities to engage with stakeholders like LRAs and CSOs on a regular basis.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
sometimes engagement with stakeholders

Depth

Citizens and all stakeholder groups, from CSOs, LRAs, community groups, farmers’ associations to cooperatives, could join the regional gatherings under the National Dialogue. 126 attendees joined the first gathering in Athlone (Midlands region) on the 23rd of June 2018, while the second gathering in Tralee (Atlantic Seaboard South Region) on the 10th of November 2018 was attended by 189 participants.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups participating

Input reflected in the process

The National Dialogue follows a clear co-creation agenda in its approach: the regional gatherings (e.g. themes discussed, activities, talks) for example are directly shaped by the participants themselves. The preferences that attendees indicated upon registering, were then taken up in the actual design of the gatherings.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully reflected



Figure 11: An interactive hub at the National Dialogue regional gathering in Athlone (Source: DCCAE)



Overall score

19 out of 20 points



Action

Resources available

Although a dedicated Secretariat was set up within the EPA to manage the National Dialogue, a consultancy (M.CO) had to be contracted by the EPA to support them in this work, in particular as concerns the organization of the regional gatherings.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
resources available to
some extent

Clear definition of the actions

The rolling annual work programme provides a detailed definition of the actions (e.g. local and regional events, outreach, etc.) taken under the National Dialogue.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Responsibilities are also clearly allocated in the National Dialogue. The DCCAE assumes political leadership in the process, while the (administrative) operation is done by the EPA Secretariat and the advisory group is providing strategic counsel.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and
clearly divided



Overall score

6,5 out of 7,5 points



Transparency

Documentation available

The DCCAE and the EPA are consistently providing detailed documentation on the ongoing National Dialogue process on their websites, in particular on the regional gatherings organized throughout the country.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made
available

Information on process available

Citizens and stakeholders are also receiving early and effective information on the National Dialogue. In this regard, the DCCAE and EPA are working in particular with public participation networks and local community groups in order to spread the word about the National Dialogue and its events, both offline and online.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made
available



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Adaptability

Strategic revision

The main procedure for strategic revision in the National Dialogue involves the yearly update of its rolling annual working programme, which is done in consultation with the advisory group and upon approval by the Minister of the DCCAE.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The National Dialogue is a flexible instrument, which is mainly due to its co-creation agenda. It is constantly evolving, as the inputs collected at the regional gatherings feed into the roll-out of its structures, events and information flows. For example, the second regional gathering built upon the outcomes and feedback collected at the first one (e.g. more time for workshop activities and roundtable discussions).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Replicability

Feasibility

The replication of the Irish National Dialogue on Climate Action is possible, and requires in particular the willingness to engage with citizens and stakeholders on an equal footing, and to also provide these actors with the opportunity to actively co-shape and co-decide on how they are being engaged with in the process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Taking the aforementioned considerations into account, this also entails that a governance framework like the Irish National Dialogue is replicable at several levels of governance (local, regional, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points





Effectiveness

Ambition

The aims of the National Dialogue are broadly defined: e.g. raising awareness to act, triggering behavioral change, facilitating the exchange of ideas, informing the development of policies, establishing networks of likeminded actors and gathering public support. While the coherence of these aims is not disputed by the citizens and stakeholders engaged, the ambition of the National Dialogue is put into question by some of these local actors attending the regional gatherings, especially by those that are already convinced about the need for bold climate action. The National Dialogue faces the challenge of meeting their high expectations, and at the same time has to mobilize new audiences that are not yet engaged on climate and energy issues.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ambitious and coherent
targets to some extent

Level of policy detail

The National Dialogue's policy orientations and mechanisms – mainly its regional gatherings and other initiatives under its umbrella – to ensure the achievement of its targets are not defined in detail. However, it could be argued that proposing (too) detailed policies from the onset would run counter to the co-creation approach the National Dialogue seeks to foster during its implementation.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible
policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The National Dialogue includes regular reporting processes to evaluate its progress. The EPA Secretariat reports on the overall delivery of the rolling annual work programme to the DCCAE and the advisory group. Furthermore, the consultancy M.CO contracted by the EPA also reports on the regional gatherings it is facilitating to the EPA and the DCCAE, which are made publicly available on the DCCAE website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular
reporting process



Overall score

7 out of 10 points



3.6 GERMANY

National Dialogue for the 2050 Climate Action Plan



› **Background**

Germany has a history of cross-party development of energy and climate governance frameworks, which resulted in high political commitment from political parties. The legislative provisions related to the Energiewende in 2011 e.g. were approved by almost all parties in the Parliament at that time. Although Germany is considered an energy transition pioneer, it has faced setbacks in recent years. It is set to miss its 2020 target of cutting GHG emissions by 40%, and is not on track to reach its 2030 goal to reduce GHG emissions by 55% compared to 1990. To remedy this situation, the country has recently announced its plans to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest and engage in a more ambitious deployment of renewables.

› **Main features of the good practice**

Several developments led to the creation of Germany's 2050 Climate Action Plan. While the energy concept of 2010 had already proposed the aim to decrease GHG emissions between 80-95% by 2050 below 1990 levels, it was not considered comprehensive enough in its scope (e.g. concerning non-energy emissions) and stakeholders could also not contribute in its drafting process. Additionally, the then re-elected Grand Coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats decided in its 2013 coalition agreement to reaffirm the 2050 target, and decided that both short- and long-term targets would need to be underpinned with a detailed strategy, concrete measures and a clear direction for investments. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement created the need for a new perspective on long-term decarbonization pathways. Contrary to the 2010 energy concept, a broad national dialogue involving stakeholders, the public and all relevant Ministries was deemed necessary this time to inform the development of strategic energy and climate measures. An unprecedented dialogue and participation process was then organized for the 2050 plan, led at national level by the German Federal Ministry of Environment (BMUB).

Total score

84 out of **100** points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The 2050 Climate Action Plan was adopted by the Cabinet in November 2016. The first draft proposed by the BMUB was heavily criticized by Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel. Following intense inter-ministerial negotiations, a trimmed down version of the plan was then adopted.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ownership to some extent

Level of support across political boundaries

Germany's 2050 plan was not proposed as a binding law, but as a strategy with guiding principles, milestones and measures for different areas and sectors of the economy. Its objective is to make Germany largely GHG-neutral by 2050. The plan was not submitted for approval to the Parliament. The Parliament was even bypassed in the consultation process, which ultimately hampered broader support for the plan across the political spectrum.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
supported to some extent

Ability to survive political change

Three years after it was adopted, the 2050 plan is still in place under the renewed Grand Coalition, and forms the basis for Germany's upcoming Climate Action Law, which is currently being discussed within Chancellor Merkel's Climate Cabinet.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
can survive political
change



**Overall
score**

7 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

In the plan, responsibilities between the national, regional and local level are clearly shared, in particular regarding the coal phase-out in affected regions. Through the 2050 Climate Action Plan, Germany established a Commission for growth, structural change and regional development, which would later decide on the 2038 coal exit date. Representatives from LRAs were part of this Commission, among other stakeholders, and negotiated with the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
strong multi-level
governance with key role
for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

During the drafting of the 2050 plan, the BMUB took leadership of the overall process, but continuously involved and coordinated with other Ministries in regular information meetings. This inter-institutional cooperation was underpinned by the aforementioned inter-ministerial negotiations, in which the final details of the plan were fleshed out after the extensive dialogue and participation process had ended.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

15 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

A Committee of Delegates formed the main governance structure for the dialogue and participation process with stakeholders and citizens on the 2050 plan. The 25-person Committee consisted of 12 citizens and 13 stakeholder representatives: each stakeholder group elected its representative during consultation meetings, while the citizen representatives were randomly selected. The BMUB was also part of the Committee as a neutral observer. The Committee was tasked with discussing and voting on the proposals for measures formulated by citizens and stakeholders during the dialogue and participation process. The adopted catalogue of measures (in total 97 measures) for the 2050 plan was then submitted to the Government.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to
deliver governance
framework

Status of governance structure

The Committee of the Delegates was put in place for the entire duration of the dialogue and participation process for the 2050 Climate Action Plan.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created
for delivery of framework



Legal bindingness

The mandate of the Committee of the Delegates did not involve taking legally binding decisions, as it could only submit measures to the Government, which then ultimately decided whether to include them in the final version of the 2050 plan.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body not
legally binding

**Overall
score**

11 out of 15 points

**Stakeholder engagement and involvement****Method**

The engagement and involvement of stakeholders for Germany's 2050 plan lasted 1,5 years and occurred through different formats in several dialogue phases. In the first phase, dialogue fora were organized specifically to consult with local authorities, the regions and associations (including CSOs, businesses, etc.), where these stakeholders could put forward proposals for measures. In the second phase, the Committee of the Delegates set up sectoral working groups, where each stakeholder group further worked on its proposed measures, and also debated the measures brought forward by the other stakeholders and by citizens invited to join the process. Following further rounds of dialogue fora, sectoral workshops and Committee of the Delegates meetings, stakeholders and citizens agreed on a catalogue of measures to be sent to the Government for the 2050 plan.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

The extensive and comprehensive dialogue and participation process enabled stakeholders to frequently join and input in the discussions on the 2050 plan.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
often engagement with
stakeholders

Depth

All relevant stakeholder groups, including LRAs, CSOs, business, industry or trade unions, were able to participate in the different formats of the consultation process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups
participating



Input reflected in the process

The stakeholder groups, especially CSOs, LRAs and businesses, criticized that despite their full engagement in this broad and time-consuming process, most of their recommendations for energy and climate measures were ultimately not included in the final 2050 Climate Action Plan. Many stakeholders felt that this result devalued their efforts, which was exacerbated by the fact that the BMUB was not transparent and accountable on why it had not included stakeholders' inputs.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully reflected



Overall score

15 out of 20 points




Figure 12: Dialogue and participation process for Germany's 2050 Climate Action Plan (Source: BMUB)



Action

Resources available

The BMUB dedicated significant resources for Germany's unprecedented dialogue and participation process for its 2050 plan. Several independent institutes were contracted to accompany the process with regular scientific inputs on the measures discussed. Furthermore, two project teams were tendered to organize and moderate the series of meetings, dialogue fora and sectoral working groups with stakeholders and citizens. The BMUB facilitated the participation of CSOs also by funding a staff member of the German umbrella association of climate and energy CSOs, Klimaallianz Deutschland, to coordinate the inputs provided by the CSOs.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
resources fully available



Clear definition of the actions

The key parameters to be fulfilled for the stakeholder and public consultation process (e.g. scope, size, formats, procedural guidance, etc.) were clearly set out by the BMUB, which provided for an effective implementation of the process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Responsibilities were clearly allocated between the BMUB (overall coordination and management), the two project teams (implementation) and the institutes providing scientific expertise for the process. However, some stakeholders and citizens criticized that the role and responsibilities of the Committee of the Delegates were not always clear during the process. Furthermore, many participants expected the Committee, given its name, to have more far-reaching decision-making powers.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
responsibilities divided to some extent

**Overall score**

6,5 out of 7,5 points

**Transparency****Documentation available**

All relevant documentation on the 2050 Climate Action plan and its dialogue and participation process was made available by the BMUB on a dedicated website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

The BMUB did not only inform the public through the website and public conferences, but also reached out to citizens, so they could actively participate in the process. 76 000 citizens were contacted in five cities across the country, out of which 500 – representing the cross-section of the population – were randomly selected to take part in citizen dialogues in these five cities to propose measures for the 2050 plan. During the citizen dialogues, 12 representatives were randomly chosen to be involved in the Committee of the Delegates. Alongside these physical meetings, all citizens had the opportunity to provide their input online and comment on the proposals issued during the citizen dialogues. The citizens' proposals for measures for the 2050 plan were then compiled in a dedicated citizen report.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made available

**Overall score**

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Adaptability

Strategic revision

Germany's 2050 plan includes a clear procedure for strategic revision, as its milestones, decarbonization pathways and measures are continuously verified and updated as necessary to ensure their consistency with meeting the plan's goals.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revisions fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The BMUB showed flexibility during the participation and dialogue process, by enabling stakeholders and citizens to adjust the process to their needs (e.g. more time for discussion). As a flexible instrument, the 2050 Climate Action Plan is equipped to integrate technical, societal, political, social and economic developments and changes, as well as results of new scientific research, in its implementation.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Replicability

Feasibility

The German dialogue and participation process for its 2050 plan can be replicated, requiring in particular to allocate sufficient time for stakeholders and citizens to exchange, the public authority in charge (in Germany's case, the BMUB) to act as neutral observer in the facilitation of the process, and to provide a clear objective for participants to contribute to (e.g. proposing concrete energy and climate measures).

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Taking this into account, the German governance framework for its 2050 Climate Action plan is replicable at several governance levels (local, regional, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points





Effectiveness

Ambition

Germany's 2050 plan includes ambitious and coherent targets, both in the short- and long-term and for all sectors (2030 targets for energy, buildings, mobility, agriculture, land use and forestry, industry and business). The 2050 goal of becoming largely GHG neutral leaves however some room for interpretation.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ambitious and coherent
targets to some extent

Level of policy detail

The plan includes clear guiding principles, milestones, decarbonization pathways and also strategic measures for all areas of action. In 2019, it will be complemented by a programme of detailed and feasible measures, enshrined in a Climate Action Law, to ensure that the 2030 sectoral and economy-wide targets are met.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible
policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The 2050 plan follows a clear, robust and Paris-compatible reporting process. It has a built-in revision mechanism every five years, aligned with the ratcheting up ambition procedure of the Paris Agreement. Once the programme of measures is adopted, annual reports will track progress and implementation of these measures. Furthermore, independent scientific experts will assess the effectiveness and impact of the measures in view of their social, environmental and economic aspects. As concerns the participation and dialogue process for the 2050 plan, the BMUB commissioned an independent evaluation which revealed key lessons about the process, which the Government seeks to remedy for future editions.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regu-
lar reporting process



**Overall
score**

7 out of 10 points



3.7 ESTONIA

Stakeholder working groups for the country's 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy



› **Background**

Energy autonomy and digitalization are defining factors of Estonia's energy and climate policies. It is one of the least import-dependent countries in the EU, as it still largely relies on its oil shale reserves to cover its energy needs. This comes at a significant environmental cost, as the exploitation of this fossil fuel accounts for some 80% of Estonia's GHG emissions. Yet, Estonia has also established itself as a digital frontrunner in Europe: it is pioneering in the introduction of new technologies such as blockchain on its national grid, with the aim to integrate more decentralized renewables in its energy system. By 2030, Estonia seeks to achieve a renewables share of 42% in its energy mix, and it has to reduce its GHG emissions by 13% compared to 2005 under the EU Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR).

› **Main features of the good practice**

The main impulse for establishing Estonia's 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy in April 2017, came from a European level. The European Council had previously defined a GHG emissions reduction target of 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990. Estonia translated this development into its 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy. It is a high-level strategy that lays out a roadmap to transition to a low carbon economy, with the objective to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 in the five sectors energy and industry, forestry and land use, transport, agriculture and waste management. In the drafting of its 2050 strategy, the Estonian Government sought to involve for the first time stakeholders directly through the format of five sectoral working groups. This unprecedented consultation process with stakeholders, which lasted for two years (2015-2016), was led at national level by the Ministry of the Environment.

Total score

83 out of **100** points



Performance across criteria in detail



Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy were broadly supported within the Government. As the final document of the 2050 strategy was proposed at the end of 2016 by the Ministry of the Environment to the Cabinet, it was approved by all Ministries without major changes.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

Following the Cabinet's approval, the 2050 strategy was submitted in April 2017 to the Parliament, where it was backed with a large majority by the political parties.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
fully supported

Ability to survive political change

Estonia's 2050 strategy is still in place two years after its adoption. While the strategy is not disputed within the political spectrum, its implementation could stagnate following the country's 2019 elections, which have seen the far-right EKRE party rise into power in a new center-right coalition. The EKRE party holds the Ministry of the Environment, and its current chairman Mart Helme has stated that he does not consider adhering to the Paris Agreement as important for Estonia.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
can survive political
change to some extent

Overall score

9 out of 10 points

› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

During the stakeholder consultation process, LRAs were involved to some extent in guiding and deciding on the overall process, as two LRAs associations were part of the Steering Committee. The 2050 strategy does not specify a sharing of responsibilities between the national level and LRAs, but calls for a cooperation with local governments on the sustainable and resilient developments of settlements.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
multi-level governance
with small role for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

Estonia implemented a well-functioning inter-institutional cooperation in the creation of its 2050 strategy. While the Ministry of the Environment led the stakeholder consultation process, it did not undertake this coordination effort alone, but provided several other Ministries and bodies with a key role. Ministries such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications or the Ministry of Rural Affairs, were also coordinating the stakeholder working groups on the five sectors. Other Ministries such as the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry for Education & Research were also engaged in the process through their participation in the Steering Committee.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

13 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

The aforementioned Steering Committee was established as the principal governance structure for the elaboration of Estonia's 2050 strategy. Its main tasks were to provide counselling and to take strategic decisions during the entire process. It consisted of representatives from several Ministries, LRAs, business and industry, and also the head of the Estonian Parliament's environment committee. The Steering Committee was chaired by the Deputy Secretary General for Climate and External Relations of the Ministry of the Environment.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
new body created to
deliver governance
framework

Status of governance structure

The Steering Committee operated for the entire duration of the 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created
for delivery of framework



Legal bindingness

While the Steering Committee assumed a key function in the drafting of the 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy as a strategic consultative body, its mandate did not consist in taking legally binding decisions.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
governance body not
legally binding

**Overall
score**

11 out of 15 points

**Stakeholder engagement and involvement****Method**

In the drafting process of the 2050 strategy, stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs were mainly involved through the working groups on the five sectors, in physical meetings but also through electronic exchanges between the participants. The starting point for the sectoral groups was the results from a study commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment on Estonia's opportunities to become a low-carbon economy by 2050. Departing from this study, the participating stakeholders brought forward their inputs to come up with guidelines and principles for their sectors, as well as for the economy as a whole.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

Over the course of the duration of the five stakeholder working groups (from March 2015 to March 2016), 25 meetings were held in total, thereby providing stakeholders with frequent opportunities to be involved in the discussions.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
often engagement with
stakeholders

Depth

80 stakeholder groups, from LRAs, CSOs, energy agencies, business, industry to universities, were invited to join the working groups. However, not all stakeholder groups were able to participate in the discussions on each sector. For some CSOs for example, it was not possible to attend the energy and industry working group, which is a key sector considering its high contribution to Estonia's GHG emissions.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
several stakeholder groups
participating



Input reflected in the process

While representatives from all stakeholder groups participated in the working groups discussions, their input was not equally reflected in the 2050 strategy process. Some CSOs noted that the number of representatives per stakeholder group was not spread evenly in the working groups, with the balance skewed towards industry and business associations. Furthermore, there were not enough opportunities for constructive discussion to go in-depth on stakeholder proposals. Lastly, some CSOs also saw the Government as being too business- and industry-focused in the discussions, which resulted in civil society not being able to shape the final 2050 strategy as much as business and industry players.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
stakeholder input reflected to some extent



Overall score

15 out of 20 points



Action

Resources available

The Estonian Government, in particular the Ministry of the Environment as the leading entity, dedicated significant human and financial resources to manage and coordinate the comprehensive and large-scale stakeholder consultation process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
resources fully available

Clear definition of the actions

The objectives and terms of reference for the stakeholder working groups were well defined from the onset, which enabled an effective implementation of the process.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Responsibilities were also clearly split: the Ministry of the Environment led the stakeholder engagement process and ultimately drew up the proposal for the 2050 strategy, while the Steering Committee provided advice and took strategic decisions.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and clearly divided



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Transparency

Documentation available

The Ministry of the Environment ensured transparency throughout the 2050 strategy drafting process, by publishing all meeting minutes of the sectoral working groups, stakeholder inputs and other documentation (e.g. draft versions) on its website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

Citizens were also informed in an early and effective manner about the 2050 strategy outside of the Government website. A public conference was held on the 2050 strategy, and citizens could also contribute through a public consultation.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made available



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Adaptability

Strategic revision

The 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy underwent strategic revisions during its drafting, mainly in the form of impact assessments that were commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment to analyze the impacts of proposed policy guidelines in terms of their socio-economic effects, their effects on energy security and their ability to reduce GHG emissions and air pollution. These impact assessments were discussed during the engagement process, which led then to the adaptation of these proposals.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included




Figure 13: The position of the 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy within Estonia's energy and climate policy framework (Source: Estonian Ministry of the Environment)

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

While the 2050 strategy was being drafted, the adoption of the Paris Agreement overhauled EU and global climate policies. In reaction to this development, the 2050 strategy included a clear reference to the Paris Agreement temperature targets.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Replicability

Feasibility

The Estonian stakeholder engagement process on its 2050 strategy is replicable and requires in particular a clear definition and division of responsibilities within the public authority in charge, openness throughout the consultation with stakeholders and the public, and a clear long-term vision to debate on.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Taking this into consideration, the Estonian governance framework for its 2050 strategy can be replicated at several governance levels (local, regional, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



Effectiveness

Ambition

The long-term objective of the 2050 strategy, which is to reduce GHG emissions by 80% compared to 1990, is underpinned by coherent intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040. The impact assessments also show how GHG emissions should fall in the sectors to comply with the strategy’s vision – e.g. the energy sector would need to reduce emissions by 67%. These sectoral targets were ultimately not included, yet, their inclusion would have strengthened the overall objective of the 2050 strategy.

Scale

1 out of 2 = ambitious and coherent targets to some extent




Figure 14: Estonia’s GHG emissions trajectory until 2050 in the sectors, excluding forestry and land use, compared to business-as-usual scenario (Source: Estonian Ministry of the Environment)

Level of policy detail

While the 2050 strategy is grounded in a robust analytical basis (e.g. impact assessments, studies, etc.) and has defined clear political and sectoral guidelines and principles, it lacks detail on specific policies, measures and instruments.

Scale

1 out of 2 = detailed and feasible policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The reporting process foreseen as of 2019 obliges the Government to report every four years to the Parliament on the implementation of the 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy. Furthermore, a review and update of the document is also planned in the same time interval, which will take into account significant changes in EU and international climate ambitions and technological developments.

Scale

1 out of 2 = clearly outlined and regular reporting to some extent



Overall score

5 out of 10 points



3.8 CALIFORNIA

Stakeholder inclusion in Global Warming Solutions Act 2006



› **Background**

The State of California is the leading State in the USA in terms of renewables deployment, energy efficiency standards and in environmental protection, but is also the 12th largest emitter of carbon worldwide. California has recently committed to reach a share of 60% renewable electricity by 2030, and seeks to completely decarbonize its power sector by 2045.

› **Main features of the good practice**

Acknowledging the need to step up GHG emission cuts, California adopted in 2006 an economy-wide law to tackle climate change and reduce emissions. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, or Assembly Bill (AB) 32, is a California State Law that established a comprehensive program to reduce GHG emissions from all sources throughout the state. The AB 32 covers virtually all sectors of the economy and envisages a combination of policies, planning, direct regulations, market approaches, incentives and voluntary efforts. AB 32 directs the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to be the lead agency to implement the law, but several other relevant state agencies are also engaged in all stages of the process. AB 32 requires the California ARB to develop a Scoping Plan, which lays out California’s strategy for meeting the goals. The Scoping Plan must be updated every five years. It is developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders and the public through dedicated workshops on each measure included in the Global Warming Solutions Act.

Total score

88 out of **100** points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

The Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) has received broad backing within the administration and from Californian Governors. The California Air Resources Board has full authority to implement the program.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

The Californian AB32 received broad support across the political spectrum at the time of its adoption. However, it is viewed more critically nowadays by many Republicans, which have grown more skeptical about the immediate need to address climate change and have voiced concerns that taking climate action would affect the State’s economy and jobs.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
supported to some extent

Ability to survive political change

With the AB 32 being in force for 13 years already, it has managed to survive political change in California (both Democratic and Republican leadership). However, the increasingly partisan political environment in the State could make future adjustments to the governance framework more difficult.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
can survive political change to some extent



Overall score

7 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

In the Scoping Plan of the AB 32, the Air Resources Board refers to local agencies as essential partners in achieving California’s GHG emission reduction goals. The Climate Change Scoping Plan also notes that cities and counties will need to actively engage in implementing Scoping Plan measures at the local level and undertake other emission reduction actions that make sense for each community. The Scoping Plan also encourages local agencies to voluntarily adopt a reduction goal for municipal operations emissions to reduce GHG emissions by 15 percent by 2020.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
multi-level governance
with small role for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

AB 32 directs the California Air Resources Board to be the lead agency to implement the law. The Climate Action Team, made up of all relevant State agencies, bodies and departments for all sectors, is charged with supporting direct State efforts on the reduction of GHG emissions and engaging State agencies.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
broad division of
responsibilities within
public authority



**Overall
score**

13 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

An existing entity, the Air Resources Board, was entrusted to lead the process.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
working group or other
entity delivering
framework

Status of governance structure

The California Air Resources Board is a permanent body, which is in charge of delivering on the targets established by the Bill and of overseeing the workings of all other relevant agencies engaged in this legislation.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
permanent body created
for delivery of framework



Legal bindingness

The California Air Resource Board, as a regulatory body of the State of California, has the mandate to take legally binding decisions. It consists of 16 members, 12 of which are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the State’s Senate.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
governance body fully
legally binding



Overall score

13 out of 15 points



Stakeholder engagement and involvement

Method

AB 32 requires the Air Resources Board to prepare and approve a Scoping Plan to bring GHG emissions by 2020 to 1990 levels. The Climate Change Scoping Plan is the Board’s “roadmap” for achieving the State’s 2020 emissions limit. Prior to approving the Climate Change Scoping Plan, the Air Resources Board and other State agencies involved with the process held extensive meetings with stakeholders on technical issues and policy proposals; public input was solicited through other ways as well such as hearings, conferences and surveys. According to the Air Resources Board, more than 42,000 people submitted comments on the plan.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

The Climate Change Scoping Plan under AB 32 is updated every five years and regular consultations with stakeholders are carried out in this time interval.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
sometimes engagement
with stakeholders

Depth

All stakeholder groups were able to participate in the engagement process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups
participating

Input reflected in the process

The California Air Resources Board broadly included the contributions from stakeholders and the public in the preparation of the Climate Change Scoping Plan.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully
reflected



Overall score

19 out of 20 points



Action

Resources available

AB 32 authorizes the collection of a fee from sources of GHGs. This fee is collected annually from large sources of GHGs, including oil refineries, electricity power plants (including imported electricity), cement plants and other industrial sources. There are approximately 250 fee payers under the current scheme. Funds collected are used to cover annual expenses for ARB and other State agencies to implement AB 32. In addition to this, investments from various sources seek to provide incentives for companies to reduce emissions.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
resources fully available

Clear definition of the actions

The Climate Change Scoping Plan under AB 32 clearly defines the actions that need to be undertaken (i.e. policies, implementation guidelines and monitoring process).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

Under the AB 32, responsibilities are clearly assigned by the Air Resources Board to the different players (i.e. relevant agencies part of the Climate Action Team, cities, counties, local agencies, industry, etc.).

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and
clearly defined



Overall score

7,5 out of **7,5** points



➤ Transparency

Documentation available

All relevant documentation is publicly available on the Air Resources Board website.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

Information on timeline, process, development and future consultations is also publicly available on the Air Resources Board website, providing engagement opportunities for the public and stakeholders in an early and effective manner.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
information fully made available



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Adaptability

Strategic revision

The Californian AB 32 requires the Climate Change Scoping Plan to be reviewed at least every five years.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The AB 32 also requires the Scoping Plan to take into consideration California's progress toward meeting the near-term emission reduction goals, highlight the latest climate change science at international level and provide clear direction on how to achieve short- and long-term emission reduction goals.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ **Replicability**

Feasibility

The Californian governance framework can be replicated, requires however as a critical step an institutional arrangement that depoliticizes policy development: in California, the Executive and Legislature effectively ceded its authorities over actual policies to a technical public regulatory body like the Air Resources Board, instead of including measures and ways to achieve targets into the law they enacted (the AB 32). The mandate of the Air Resources Board was hence enshrined in law.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
replication possible to a
medium extent

Governance level

Transposing the Californian governance framework at other governance levels (e.g. local, regional) would mean that a body such as a local or regional energy agency could be assigned a mandate enshrined in law by LRAs policymakers.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication possible
at multiple levels of
governance



Overall score

6,5 out of 7,5 points



Effectiveness

Ambition

AB 32 sets stringent GHG emission reduction targets in the short-term. However, some Californian CSOs have criticized a lack of ambition as concerns the failure of introducing the 2050 long-term goal (cut GHG emissions by 80% by 2050) directly into the legal framework. The 2050 objective is only placed in Executive Orders.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ambitious and coherent targets to some extent




Figure 15: California GHG emissions trajectory from 1990 till 2050 (Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration)

Level of policy detail

The Scoping Plan outlines 69 policies, some more and some less fleshed out in detail, to achieve GHG emission reductions over six clearly identified areas.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The Californian AB 32 requires regular updates (as mentioned earlier, at least once every five years) and clearly defines monitoring and reporting requirements.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular reporting process



Overall score

7 out of 10 points



3.9 CANADA

Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change Plan



› **Background**

The lion's share of Canada's GHG emissions (over 80 percent) result from energy production and use, such as its carbon-intensive oil sands industry. After committing to the Paris Agreement in 2015, Canada has set itself a 2030 GHG emission reduction target of minus 30% compared to 2005 levels. This target should be achieved in particular through climate mitigation actions in Canada's energy sector.

› **Main features of the good practice**

The Pan-Canadian Framework was built on the momentum of the Paris Agreement. The idea behind it was to develop a concrete plan that allowed Canada to achieve its international commitments. When First Ministers met in March 2016 in Vancouver, they agreed to take ambitious action in support of meeting or exceeding Canada's 2030 target of a 30% reduction below 2005 GHG emission levels. First Ministers issued the Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change and agreed that a collaborative approach between provincial, territorial, and federal governments was important to reduce GHG emissions and to enable sustainable economic growth. The 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change (PCF) is built on four pillars: pricing carbon pollution, complementary actions to reduce emissions across the economy, adaptation and climate resilience, and clean technology, innovation, and jobs. The PCF includes more than fifty concrete actions that cover all sectors of the Canadian economy, and positions Canada to meet its Paris Agreement greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target of 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. It was developed following the Vancouver Declaration.


Total score

77 out of
100 points



Performance across criteria in detail





Political commitment

Level of ownership within the public authority in charge

All First Ministers agreed to issue the Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change and undertake a collaborative approach between provincial, territorial, and federal governments to reduce GHG emissions and to enable sustainable economic growth.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
high level of ownership

Level of support across political boundaries

The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change was adopted by 11 of its 13 Regions and Territories that are governed by different political parties. Such an agreement on climate change policy was never achieved before in Canada.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
supported to some extent

Ability to survive political change

Regions and Territories can pull out of the Pan-Canadian Framework if they wish to do so. This reduces the likelihood of the framework to survive political change. In 2018, Alberta e.g. already pulled out of the Pan-Canadian Framework.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
not likely to survive political change



Overall score

5 out of 10 points



› Institutional collaboration

Multi-level governance

As a collaborative effort of federal, provincial and territorial governments, the PCF resulted in a broad sharing of responsibilities between the different governance levels in Canada. The implementation of the Framework leaves the flexibility to provinces and territories to design and implement measures of their choosing to reach the objectives set in the Framework.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
strong multi-level
governance with key role
for LRAs

Cooperation within public authority

In the development of the Pan-Canadian Framework, Ministerial tables were convened to provide their advice, including the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Ministers of Innovation, Ministers of Energy, and Ministers of Finance.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
some division of
responsibilities within
public authority



Overall score

13 out of 15 points



› Governance structure

Existence of governance structure

Under the Canadian PCF, federal, provincial and territorial governments are committed to collaborate through the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment to track and report GHG emissions consistently across the country, to monitor progress of the PCF, and to support international reporting obligations. The PCF has not set up a dedicated governance structure to oversee its implementation.

Scale

0 out of 2 =
no body set up to deliver
governance framework

Status of governance structure

Not applicable, as no dedicated governance structure was created in the PCF.



Legal bindingness

In absence of a dedicated governance structure, the PCF still sets binding targets with regard to GHG emission reduction and carbon pricing. In order to reach specific targets included in the Framework, legally binding Federal Acts can be issued and will apply to all provinces and territories that have adopted the Framework. For example, in 2018 the Federal GHG Pollution Pricing Act was adopted and applied across the country. However, the Federal Government has also committed to ensuring that the provinces and territories have the flexibility to design their own policies and programs to meet GHG emission reductions targets, supported by Federal investments in infrastructure, specific emission-reduction opportunities and clean technologies.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
governance framework
somewhat legally binding

**Overall score**

5 out of 15 points

**Stakeholder engagement and involvement****Method**

Under the Vancouver Declaration, First Ministers asked four federal-provincial-territorial working groups to work with Indigenous Peoples; to consult with the public, businesses and civil society; and to present options to act on climate change and enable clean growth. The working groups heard solutions directly from citizens, through an interactive website, in-person engagement sessions, and independent town halls. Representatives of Indigenous Peoples contributed either directly to working groups or to Ministers, which helped shape this framework. Ministers also reached out to citizens, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and Indigenous Peoples to hear their priorities.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
several forms of
consultation

Frequency

The frequency of engagement of stakeholders is not clearly specified in the PCF. A loose reference is made to the requirement that public reporting on policies and measures must be complemented by ongoing public outreach, including with youth, inviting their contributions to Canada's action on clean growth and climate change.

Scale

2 out of 3 =
sometimes engagement
with stakeholders

Depth

All stakeholder groups could participate in the Canadian PCF process.

Scale

3 out of 3 =
all stakeholder groups
participating



Input reflected in the process

The Pan-Canadian Framework was built on the input collected through public consultations and workshops with stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
stakeholder input fully reflected



Overall score

19 out of 20 points



Action

Resources available

Annex 1 of the Framework outlines in detail Federal investments for the transition to a clean growth economy. New investments are planned to complement provincial and territorial actions and investments, including investments in infrastructure, the Low-Carbon Economy Fund, and clean technology funding.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
resources fully made available

Clear definition of the actions

The second annex of the Canadian PCF outlines provincial and territorial accomplishments in reducing GHG emissions and accelerating clean growth, and presents steps that each jurisdiction has taken or is taking to implement carbon pricing. The annex also outlines areas where the Federal Government and each provincial and territorial government collaborate to implement the PCF in order to spur growth and jobs, reduce emissions and adapt to climate change.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
actions clearly defined

Clear division of responsibilities

The overarching Framework was adopted by the Federal Government and agreed by the First Ministers. Responsibilities are clearly allocated, with each province and territory retaining jurisdiction over the measures to achieve the set objectives.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
responsibilities fully and clearly defined



Overall score

5,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Transparency

Documentation available

The Pan-Canadian Framework, as well as the annual reports on implementation, are easily accessible on the website of the Canadian Government.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
documentation fully made available

Information on process available

The website of the Canadian Government contains all the relevant information with regard to the process for the development of the Framework. However, some more detailed information on the next steps of the process are missing.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
information made available to some extent



Overall score

5,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Adaptability

Strategic revision

Federal, provincial, and territorial governments collaborate to establish the approach to the review of carbon pricing, including expert assessment of stringency and effectiveness that compares carbon pricing systems across Canada, which will be completed by early 2022 to provide certainty on the path forward. An interim report will be completed in 2020, which will be reviewed and assessed by First Ministers. Federal, provincial, and territorial governments will continue to engage and partner up with Indigenous Peoples, as actions are implemented and progress is tracked.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
procedures for strategic revision fully included

Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

The Pan-Canadian Framework requires reports to be compiled every year. Annual reports to First Ministers enable Governments to take stock of progress, react to developments and give direction to sustain and enhance efforts.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
full capacity to adjust to changes and challenges



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Replicability

Feasibility

The Pan-Canadian Framework is an overarching strategy to tackle carbon emissions that can be easily replicated in other constituencies, requiring in particular political will, a clear target to work on and the flexibility to accommodate the interests of a broad range of actors (e.g. provinces, territories, stakeholder groups, etc.)

Scale

3 out of 3 =
replication possible to a high extent

Governance level

Following these parameters, the PCF is replicable at any level of governance.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
replication at multiple levels of governance



Overall score

7,5 out of 7,5 points



➤ Effectiveness

Ambition

The Pan-Canadian Framework sets Canada's GHG target for 2030 to minus 30% GHG emissions compared to 2005. In order to achieve this target, the Framework relies on four pillars, the most important of which is carbon pricing. While the key policies identified appear to be coherent with the target set, some Canadian climate NGOs and activists have claimed that the 30% target is not ambitious enough.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
ambitious and coherent targets to some extent

Level of policy detail

As overarching Framework, the Canadian PCF mandates carbon emission targets and supporting actions. Specific and detailed measures are however left to the discretion of the regions and territories.

Scale

1 out of 2 =
detailed and feasible policies to some extent

Monitoring and evaluation

The Pan-Canadian Framework includes regular reporting processes to evaluate policy progress, as it mandates annual reports on GHG emissions and measures.

Scale

2 out of 2 =
clearly outlined and regular reporting process



Overall score

7 out of 10 points



Comparative overview of good practices in energy and climate governance									
Criteria	EU countries							Non-EU countries	
	France	Netherlands	Sweden	Luxembourg	Ireland	Germany	Estonia	California	Canada
Political commitment	10	9	10	10	10	7	9	7	5
Institutional collaboration	15	15	11	15	11	15	13	13	13
Governance structure	11	13	11	9	11	11	11	13	5
Stakeholder engagement & involvement	20	19	20	20	19	15	15	19	19
Action	5,5	6,5	7,5	7,5	6,5	6,5	7,5	7,5	7,5
Transparency	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	5,5
Adaptability	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5
Replicability	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	7,5	6,5	7,5
Effectiveness	9	7	10	7	7	7	5	7	7
Total Points	93	92	92	91	87	84	83	88	77

› Takeaways AND Recommendations ‹

This report has presented good practices in energy and climate governance in the form of case studies from seven EU Member States – the Netherlands, Estonia, Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg – as well as from outside Europe, by focusing on Canada and the US State of California. The objective has been to highlight how these good practices have managed to involve LRAs, CSOs, other stakeholders and the public in effective participation processes. In these nine examples, a strong governance framework has been established in the form of a multilevel climate and energy dialogue, which tapped into the opportunities offered by broadly involving the public and stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs.

The takeaways and recommendations derived from the experiences of all these case studies seek to support and provide guidance for national policymakers in the five LIFE PlanUp focus countries and other EU countries in developing and implementing their multilevel climate and energy dialogues in the framework of their NECPs. Through this undertaking, the project aims to provide possible venues for EU Member States in particular concerning the involvement of actors like LRAs and CSOs. This should contribute to

increase public support and ownership, strengthen coordination and cooperation between these actors and national policymakers, and bridge the gap between the local and the national level in the NECP process.

Taking into account national specificities and rules, and considering the differences in political, legal and regulatory frameworks, the LIFE PlanUp project drew the following takeaways and recommendations:



Takeaway 1

A high level of ownership is not only crucial within the public authority in charge, but also across the political spectrum, to ensure the long-term duration of a governance framework that is resilient to political cycles

An important factor in securing political commitment for a governance framework within the public authority in charge (e.g. from high-level political figures and bodies), is to define it as a key objective of the Government program. This was the case notably in Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands, where the parties in power included their energy and climate governance frameworks as a vital part of their coalition agreements, thus making it a political priority. The ability of a governance framework to survive political change then depends on whether it is broadly backed across political boundaries. Without such support and ownership, it would risk being dissolved when a new Government is voted into power.

Recommendation 1

Involve key political institutions from the onset in designing an energy and climate governance framework to gather strong political backing for it

Key institutions such as the Parliament need to have a say from the beginning onwards in the creation of governance frameworks, in order to gain the broad political support that is vital for such a framework to endure. In Sweden, the Government directly involved the Parliament, by instructing the Cross-Party Committee on Environmental Objectives to develop a proposal for the country's long-term climate policy framework. Seven out of eight parties in the Parliament took part in this Committee, with only one party (the far right Sweden Democrats) not joining. The proposal drafted by the Committee was then adopted by the seven political parties with a large majority. Having the parties on board in creating Sweden's governance framework was crucial to ensure strong political backing for it.

Takeaway 2

Collaboration and alignment between different governance levels can amplify the impact of a governance framework

The energy and climate action triggered by local and regional authorities through their comprehensive plans and strategies can bring a vital contribution to national efforts in a governance framework. The degree of coordination and cooperation between the local, regional and national level has thus the potential to amplify the impact of such a framework. The mutual sharing of responsibilities, benefits and burdens in a multi-level governance setting is critical in this regard. In the Netherlands, the climate agreement is grounded in this approach, where local efforts (e.g. phasing out gas in the built environment) and the regional energy strategies of the 33 Dutch regions, both enabled by national support, contribute and add up to achieving the country's energy and climate targets under the agreement.

Recommendation 2

Entrust local and regional authorities with a key role in a governance framework to achieve national energy and climate goals

Countries should work with local and regional authorities as strategic partners in their governance frameworks, in order to meet and even aim to surpass their energy and climate objectives. Alongside entrusting LRAs with a key role, this also entails providing them with the necessary means to carry out this role effectively. In Luxembourg for example, the Government used the Climate Pact to make its municipalities a strategic partner in the efforts to reach the national 2020 GHG emission reduction target. Under the Climate Pact, all Luxembourgish municipalities voluntarily commit to take action to reduce their GHG emissions and track their progress through the EEA system, and are in return supported by the Government with critical financial and technical assistance in their process. And as the experience of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change shows, it is also important in this regard to leave local and regional authorities with the flexibility to design and implement climate and energy measures of their choosing, in order to fulfill their key role.

Takeaway 3

Sharing responsibilities within the public authority in charge can prove beneficial in the design and delivery of a governance framework

A governance framework is often led by one entity, such as a Ministry, within the public authority in charge. Yet, its development and implementation can benefit in several ways from the cooperation and broad sharing of responsibilities between different entities (such as other Ministries, agencies, etc.). In the case of the Californian 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act e.g., the Air Resources Board receives key support from the Climate Action Team, made up of all relevant state agencies, bodies and departments, in implementing the law. In Canada, the Ministerial tables convened provided valuable advice in the development of the Pan-Canadian Framework. And in Luxembourg, the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development, as leading entity of the Climate Pact, entrusted the national energy agency myenergy with the operation of this governance framework.

Recommendation 3

The leading institution should provide other entities with key functions in the process

Considering the advantages brought by cooperation and sharing responsibilities, the leading institution within the public authority in charge should provide other entities with key roles in the governance framework. Estonia can be viewed as a reference example in this regard. Its Ministry of Environment led the coordination of the country's unprecedented stakeholder consultation process in the creation of the 2050 General Principles of Climate Policy, but effectively shared responsibilities with several other Ministries, and provided national bodies and the Estonian Parliament with key functions. Some Ministries were managing the five sectoral working groups with stakeholders which drew up proposals for the 2050 strategy. Other Ministries, national agencies and the Parliament were involved in the Steering Committee, providing counselling and making strategic decisions on the overall process.

Takeaway 4

Setting up a dedicated, permanent and legally enshrined structure can provide a stable anchor for a governance framework to function

Whether it is a Council, a Committee or a Secretariat, such a dedicated, permanent and legally enshrined structure is vital in strengthening a governance framework. Both in the development and implementation of a framework, a governance structure can assume key roles such as facilitating input from stakeholders and citizens, providing expertise or tracking progress made. Oftentimes, representatives from stakeholders, including from LRAs and CSOs, as well as from the public authority in charge, are involved in such a structure. In the Dutch climate agreement process e.g., a Climate Council was tasked with coordinating the debate and negotiation process with stakeholders, reporting on its progress and also making proposals for monitoring and evaluation for the implementation of the agreement. In Ireland, a Secretariat within the country's Environmental Protection Agency is managing the ongoing National Dialogue on Climate Action, supported by an advisory group.

Recommendation 4

Provide the governance structure with the necessary means and a clear mandate

In order to be able to assume and carry out its assigned functions in a governance framework, the governance structure has to be equipped with the required means, both in terms of human and financial resources. It should also be provided with a clear mandate to ensure its effectiveness. In France for example, the National Council for the Ecological Transition that was established as a result of the National Debate on the Energy Transition, serves as a representative stakeholder body to institutionalize the permanent consultation of stakeholders on energy and climate issues. In California, the Air Resources Board is funded in its entire operation through the collection of a fee from sources of GHGs. As a regulatory body, the Californian Air Resources Board even has the mandate to take legally binding decisions in implementing the 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act.

Takeaway 5

Public ownership and support can be achieved through broad, frequent and fair involvement of stakeholders and citizens, in particular local and regional authorities and civil society organizations

Enabling stakeholders, especially LRAs and CSOs, and citizens to participate in a broad, frequent and fair manner in the development and implementation of a governance framework, is crucial to foster public ownership and support for it. There is no shortage of ways for national policymakers to interact with stakeholders and citizens, as the wealth of formats used in the good practices demonstrate. In Germany's unprecedented dialogue and participation process for its 2050 Climate Action Plan for example, dialogue fora were organized in several phases to consult specifically with local authorities, the regions, associations and citizens. In Sweden, LRAs and CSOs representatives were part of the Cross-Party Committee which drafted the proposal for the climate policy framework. Ireland is organizing regional gatherings across the country for its National Dialogue on Climate Action. Estonia, Luxembourg, France, Germany and the Netherlands all used working groups or roundtables to often discuss specific themes or sectors with their stakeholders.

Recommendation 5

Engage and involve stakeholders and citizens through formats that enable co-creation, promote real debates and strike a balance of representation between all interests

In order to effectively engage and involve stakeholders and citizens, formats should be used that allow for co-creation, trigger real debates and ensure a balance of representation between all interest groups. These formats stand a higher chance of fostering public ownership and support. The notion of co-creation is shown e.g. by the Irish National Dialogue, which enables the participants of its regional gatherings to directly shape the design of these events. The formats used within the French National Debate, such as the local and regional debates, plenary sessions, public hearings and the citizen energy day, promoted profound debates on the country's vision for the energy transition. In Netherlands and Sweden, all stakeholders were listened to equally and a balance of representation established between more (e.g. business, industry) and less (e.g. LRAs, CSOs) resourceful stakeholder groups, thereby providing a level playing field in the fair, open and constructive discussions.

Takeaway 6

Including stakeholders' and citizens' inputs, in particular from local and regional authorities and civil society organizations, can strengthen public buy-in even further and mobilize local actors

By integrating the contributions of stakeholders, in particular from LRAs and CSOs, and citizens in the design and delivery of a governance framework, public buy-in can be increased even further and local actors mobilized for energy and climate action. This also ensures that the time and effort that stakeholders and citizens dedicate to participating in the process is not in vain. A case in point here is the National Debate on the Energy Transition in France: the key policy recommendations resulting from the debate were later integrated in the Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth. In Luxembourg, especially the views from municipalities were taken up in the development and implementation of the Climate Pact. As a result, the Climate Pact succeeded in mobilizing all 105 Luxembourgish municipalities.

Recommendation 6

Enable stakeholders and citizens to co-shape the process to develop and implement a governance framework

Taking into account the opportunities offered by including the inputs of stakeholders and citizens, national policymakers should enable these local actors to actively co-shape the process to design and deliver a governance framework. France can be seen as a reference example in this regard. During the French National Debate on the Energy Transition, stakeholders such as LRAs and CSOs could shape how the debate would be held and which policy recommendations would be drawn from it. In addition to this, the French permanent representative stakeholder body, the National Council for the Ecological Transition, was involved in the entire duration of drafting the Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth. Several of its members were part of a special stakeholder commission, which directly worked with the Government to ensure that all recommendations from the debate would be included in the law proposal submitted to the French Parliament.

Takeaway 7

Putting the resources in place is a prerequisite in the successful design and delivery of a governance framework

Alongside its more political parameters, an energy and climate governance framework also needs to be equipped with the necessary means (e.g. human and financial resources) and direction to succeed in its development and implementation. Furthermore, responsibilities have to be clearly defined and allocated between the relevant actors from the onset, in order to be able to set the right course for action.

Recommendation 7

Make a governance framework actionable through allocating sufficient resources, clearly defining the actions to undertake and establishing a clear division of responsibilities

National policymakers should ensure the good functioning of a governance framework by allocating sufficient resources, clearly defining the actions to undertake and establishing a clear division of responsibilities between the relevant actors. In the case of Germany e.g., the Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMUB) dedicated significant means to organize the country's broad dialogue and participation process for its 2050 plan. It contracted several institutes to provide scientific expertise throughout the process, tendered two project teams to moderate the dialogue fora, meetings and sectoral working groups with stakeholders and citizens, and also funded the German umbrella association of climate and energy CSOs to coordinate the inputs provided by civil society. The BMUB also clearly set out the key parameters to be fulfilled for the dialogue and participation process (e.g. scope, size, formats, procedural guidance, etc.), thus providing for an effective implementation. An example for a clear division of responsibilities can be found in Luxembourg's Climate Pact, where the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development ensures political leadership, the national energy agency myenergy handles the administrative operation of the overall framework, and the municipalities take energy and climate action in particular in those areas where they can create the most impact.

Takeaway 8

Transparency and openness strengthens trust and credibility of a governance framework

Stakeholders such as LRAs, CSOs and the general public have the legal right to know at which time, in what way and where they can provide their views and inputs in the design and delivery process of an energy and climate governance framework. It is hence critical in such frameworks to foster transparency and openness in a proactive manner, as it contributes to strengthening trust and credibility.

Recommendation 8

Make documentation and information available in an early and effective manner

Documentation and information should be fully made available to stakeholders and the general public in an early and effective manner, in order to provide these actors with a fair opportunity to submit their contributions. A good practice in this regard can be found in Estonia, where the stakeholder consultation and drafting process for the 2050 strategy was open, transparent and fully documented throughout its duration. The Ministry of Environment e.g. published all meeting minutes of the sectoral working groups with stakeholders on its website. In Germany and France, the public authorities in charge not only informed citizens about their dialogue and participation processes, but also enabled them to actively take part in shaping these processes by having them join stakeholder and citizen committees. And in the Dutch climate agreement process, citizen talks and regional meetings were organized to provide an open forum for citizens to discuss the agreement with its negotiators.

Takeaway 9

The robustness and longevity of a governance framework depends on its level of adaptability

Whether an energy and climate governance framework can be considered as robust and long-lasting, also depends on its ability to adapt. Unforeseen changes and challenges, either endogenous or exogenous, can result in impairing the potential of a governance framework to steer the energy and climate transition in the long-term. Maintaining a high level of adaptability is then also a critical success factor in the development and implementation of such a framework.

Recommendation 9

Include sound and regular procedures for strategic revision and build the capacity to adjust to changes and challenges

National policymakers should integrate in their governance frameworks sound and regular procedures for strategic revision and build its capacity to adjust to unforeseen internal or external changes and challenges. The Swedish climate policy framework for example outlines in its Climate Act such a strategic revision procedure. The Climate Act stipulates that the Government has to submit a yearly climate report to the Parliament as part of the annual budget bill. In the climate report, an assessment has to be made which identifies whether additional measures are needed to deliver the necessary emission reductions. This can result also in the adoption of additional reduction targets to meet the framework's objective of net-zero GHG emissions by 2045. In the case of Luxembourg e.g., the Climate Pact's capacity to adjust to changes and challenges is demonstrated by its effectiveness in developing new tools and instruments for the new priorities (air quality and circular economy) it introduced in reaction to societal trends.

Takeaway 10

A governance framework may look ideal on paper, but could still not deliver in the implementation

In order to prevent a governance framework from turning into a paper tiger in its implementation, three key components are required: targets, policies and monitoring. The effectiveness of an energy and climate governance framework depends also on how these components interlink with each other. An insufficiently defined target that leaves room for interpretation e.g. would complicate the reporting process, as the progress in meeting this target could not be conclusively evaluated.

Recommendation 10

Ensure effectiveness by putting in place ambitious and coherent targets, establishing detailed and feasible policies to secure achievement of the targets, and by including a clear and robust monitoring and evaluation process to track progress

In order to ensure the effectiveness of an energy and climate governance framework, ambitious and coherent targets should be put in place, detailed and feasible policy orientations and mechanisms to secure the achievement of the targets should be established, and a clear and robust monitoring and evaluation process should be included to track progress. The examples from France, Germany and Sweden stand out in this regard. The French Law on the Energy Transition for Green Growth contains legally binding ambitious and coherent targets, with clear intermediary milestones and also supporting objectives that can be adapted over time. The binding targets cover not only GHG emissions, energy efficiency and renewables, but also different sectors. The achievement of these targets is further ensured through detailed and feasible policies, which are outlined in the French law's two planning instruments, the National Low-Carbon Strategy and the Multiannual Energy Plan. In the case of Germany, the 2050 Climate Action Plan follows a clear and robust reporting process that is compatible with the Paris Agreement. It includes a built-in revision mechanism every five years that is aligned with the ratcheting up ambition procedure of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, once the programme's measures are adopted for the 2050 plan, annual reports will track the progress of these measures. Independent scientific experts will then be tasked with assessing their effectiveness and impact. And as concerns the participation and dialogue process for the 2050 plan, the German BMUB commissioned an independent evaluation which revealed key lessons about the process, which the Government seeks to remedy for future editions. Finally in Sweden, the newly established independent Climate Policy Council holds a key role in monitoring and evaluating the Government's performance in meeting the objectives of the climate policy framework. The in-depth assessments of the scientific experts of the Climate Policy Council verify whether the country is on track or not to reach its goals. Although the Council cannot enforce compliance, its analyses and reports can increase the Government's public accountability and raise pressure from the Parliament.



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Figure 2: <https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Etude/201805-IddriStudy0318-ClimateGovernanceFrance-EN.pdf>

Figure 3: https://climatedialogue.eu/sites/default/files/2018-02/ST0317_EU%202050%20long-term%20strategies_OS%20et%20al..pdf

Figure 4: https://www.klimaatakkkoord.nl/binaries/medium/content/gallery/klimaatakkkoord/content-afbeeldingen/organogram/infographics_klimaatakkkoord_tafel_taakgroepen--840px.jpg

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Figure 11: <https://www.dccae.gov.ie/images/NDCA%20Image%201.jpg>

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Figure 13: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/3_Estonia.pdf

Figure 14: https://www.envir.ee/sites/default/files/kpp_joonis_1.png

Figure 15: <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34792>

› Interviews & Correspondences were conducted with representatives from ◀

› City of Delft	› City of Rakvere
› City of Växjö	› CLER – Réseau pour la transition énergétique
› Cork County Council	› Estonian Fund for Nature
› Estonian Ministry of the Environment	› Friends of the Irish Environment
› German Federal Ministry of Environment	› Germanwatch
› Irish Department of Communications, Climate Action & Environment	› Irish Environmental Protection Agency
› Luxembourgish Ministry of Sustainable Development and Infrastructure	› myenergy
› Natuur en Milieu	› Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU
› Réseau Action Climat France	› Swedish Ministry of the Environment and Energy
› The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation	

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› Annex: Template for selecting and collecting good practices in energy and climate governance ◀

General Information	
Title of good practice	Freely filled in
Country	Freely filled in
Governance level & organization / institution in charge	National – Regional – Local Name of organization / institution in charge
Starting year	Freely filled in
Status	Ongoing / Completed
National framework	Short description of national context and climate and energy objectives
Summary of good practice	Ca. 100 words, with rationale & objectives
Pictures	2-3 pictures illustrating the good practice

Political commitment	
Level of ownership within the public authority in charge: Is the measure backed by high-level political bodies and figures?	0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer
Level of support across political boundaries: Is the measure supported across the political spectrum?	0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer
Ability to survive political change: Can the measure survive political change?	0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer

Institutional collaboration	
Multi-level governance: Are responsibilities shared vertically among different governance levels (local – regional – national) in the measure?	0 = no 1 = yes, some sharing with small role for LRAs 2 = yes, significant sharing with key role for LRAs Tick corresponding score & explain answer
Cooperation within public authority: Are responsibilities divided among different entities in the public authority in charge? (e.g. different ministries)	0 = no 1 = yes, some division 2 = yes, broad division Tick corresponding score & explain answer

Governance structure	
<p>Existence of governance structure: Is there a dedicated institutional body or arrangement in the measure?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, working group e.g. or similar 2 = yes, new body created for delivery Tick corresponding score & explain answer If available, attach organizational chart of the governance structure</p>
<p>Status of governance structure: What is the status of the dedicated body or arrangement in the measure?</p>	<p>Skip if previous indicator = 0 1 = temporary body created for delivery 2 = permanent body created for delivery Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Legal bindingness: To which extent is the body or arrangement legally binding?</p>	<p>0 = non-binding 1 = somewhat legally binding 2 = fully legally binding Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Stakeholder engagement & involvement	
<p>Method: How are stakeholders, in particular LRAs & CSOs, consulted in process?</p>	<p>0 = no form of consultation 1 = only public consultation 2 = several forms of consultation Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Frequency: How frequent are stakeholders, in particular LRAs & CSOs, engaged with by the public authority in charge of the measure?</p>	<p>0 = never 1 = rarely 2 = sometimes 3 = often Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Depth: Which stakeholder group could participate?</p>	<p>0 = no groups 1 = only one group 2 = several groups 3 = all groups Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Input reflected in the process: Were views from the stakeholders, in particular LRAs & CSOs, reflected during process?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Action	
<p>Resources available: Are there enough resources – human, financial, etc. – available in the measure?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Clear definition of the actions: Are the actions clearly defined in the measure?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Clear division of responsibilities: Are responsibilities clearly allocated in the measure?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Transparency	
<p>Documentation available: Is documentation on the measure available to the public?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Information on process available: Is information on the process of measure available to public?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Adaptability	
<p>Strategic revision: Does the governance measure include procedures for strategic revision?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Capacity to adjust to changes and challenges: Is the measure capable of adjusting to changes and challenges? (endogenous and exogenous)</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Replicability	
<p>Feasibility: To which extent is replication of measure possible?</p>	<p>0 = not possible 1 = low extent 2 = medium extent 3 = high extent Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Governance level: At how many levels can the measure be replicated?</p>	<p>0 = no level of governance 1 = only one level of governance 2 = multiple levels of governance Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Effectiveness	
<p>Ambition: Does the governance measure have ambitious and coherent targets?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Level of policy detail: Does the measure provide detailed and feasible policy orientations and mechanisms to ensure the achievement of the targets?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, to some extent 2 = yes, fully Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>
<p>Monitoring & evaluation: Does the governance measure include regular reporting processes, aiming at evaluating policy progress?</p>	<p>0 = no 1 = yes, some 2 = yes, clearly outlined and regular Tick corresponding score & explain answer</p>

Further information	
<p>Useful links:</p>	<p>Freely filled in</p>
<p>Contact Details for more information on the good practice:</p>	<p>Freely filled in</p>
<p>Website:</p>	<p>Freely filled in</p>



LIFE PlanUp project description

LIFE PlanUp supports the shift to a low-carbon and resilient economy through the development and implementation of effective and ambitious national 2030 energy and climate plans (NECPs) in Hungary, Poland, Romania, Spain and Italy. A key objective of the PlanUp project is to strengthen the climate and energy governance processes in these countries by increasing the involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the development and implementation of the NECPs. Aiming to support the five target countries in strengthening their national NECPs and to engage in their development, a core action of the PlanUp project is the participatory assessment of draft and final NECPs. In order to conduct meaningful and consistent analyses for all five Member States, we developed a set of assessment criteria that will guide the assessments and ensure their comparability.



For strong and inclusive
energy and climate plans

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